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Software plays an increasingly important role in modern safety-critical systems. 
Although research has been done to integrate software into the classical Probability 
Risk Assessment (PRA) framework, current PRA practice overwhelmingly neglects 
the contribution of software to system risk. The objective of this research is to 
develop a methodology to integrate software contributions in the Dynamic 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (DPRA) environment. 
DPRA is considered to be the next generation of PRA techniques. It is a set of 
methods and techniques in which simulation models that represent the behavior of the 
elements of a system are exercised in order to identify risks and vulnerabilities of the 
system. DPRA allows consideration of dynamic interactions of system elements and 
physical variables. The fact remains, however, that modeling software for use in the 
DPRA framework is also quite complex and very little has been done to address the 
question directly and comprehensively. 
  
This dissertation describes a framework and a set of techniques to extend the DPRA 
approach to allow consideration of the software contributions on system risk. The 
framework includes a software representation, an approach to incorporate the 
software representation into the DPRA environment SimPRA, and an experimental 
demonstration of the methodology. 
This dissertation also proposes a framework to simulate the multi-level objects in the 
simulation based DPRA environment. This is a new methodology to address the state 
explosion problem. The results indicate that the DPRA simulation performance is 
improved using the new approach. The entire methodology is implemented in the 
SimPRA software. An easy to use tool is developed to help the analyst to develop the 
software model.   
This study is the first systematic effort to integrate software risk contributions into the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Research Objective 
The objective of this research is to extend current dynamic PRA methodology to 
integrate software behavior and risk contributions in the risk assessment process. 
Accordingly this research proposes a multi-level software representation and an 
approach to integrate such representation into the Simulation-based dynamic PRA 
(SimPRA) environment. The adaptive rules for adjusting multi-level components are 
designed in this research. It is shown that such adaptive rules increase the efficiency 
of the simulation, and mitigate the state explosion issue in Dynamic PRA 
environment. A case study is conducted demonstrate the usefulness of the framework 
and the methodology. 
1.2 Research Statement 
Modern safety critical systems usually are complex hybrid systems of hardware, 
software, and human operators. By taking over many of the hardware and human 
tasks, software is increasingly playing an important role in the systems. This naturally 
translates into an increase in the software’s contribution to the system risk. A 
significant number of system failures can be attributed to software failures, such as 
the well known Northeast Blackout of 2003, Therac-25 radiation overdose accidents, 





Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a methodology for identifying and assessing 
the probability of situations leading to undesired state of a system. It has been widely 
used to assess the likelihood of accident scenarios following an initiating failure or 
perturbation event. Classical PRA focuses on answering three basic questions: (i) 
What can go wrong? (ii) What is the consequence? (iii) What’s the likelihood of such 
events? PRA is used to assess, predict, and reduce the risk of large technological 
systems. NASA, for example, requires PRA for all manned missions as well as for all 
missions with nuclear payloads or nuclear fuel. PRA has been proven to be a 
systematic, logical, and comprehensive methodology for risk assessment. In classical 
PRA method, the analysts need to construct separate models describing system 
vulnerabilities and risks. However the dynamic interactions among the components 
inside the system often make it infeasible to identify and predict all the possible 
scenarios. Enumeration of risk scenarios in case of highly complex and hybrid 
systems of hardware, software and human components is very difficult using the 
classical PRA method. The quality of a PRA is completely analyst dependent. 
Some research has been conducted on the integration of software into the traditional 
PRA framework [1-3]. However the classical PRA framework is widely believed to 
be very limiting when it comes to identifying software and human contributions to 
system risk. Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (DPRA) is a set of methods and 
techniques in which executable models that represent the behavior of the elements of 
a system are exercised in order to identify risks and vulnerabilities of the system [4]. 
Using the DPRA method, the analyst no longer needs to identify and enumerate all 





scenarios based on the system model. This observation has been one of the bases of 
the argument for the need for DPRA. The fact remains however that modeling 
software for use in the DPRA framework, is also quite complex and very little has 
been done to address the question directly and comprehensively. This research 
focuses on the software modeling for use in a simulation-based dynamic PRA 
environment. 
1.3 Approach 
A software representation methodology is proposed. The software model is integrated 
into the SimPRA dynamic PRA simulation environment. The software representation 
is a conceptual model of the software that allows consideration of software as an 
integral component of the system and contributor to risk, to the same level as humans 
or hardware. A multi-level software representation framework is established for the 
SimPRA environment. It includes both a behavior model and a simulation guidance 
model. The behavior model is an executable model. It is plugged into the system 
model to represent the software behavior. It is able to capture all phenomena that fall 
within the scope of the analysis. The software guidance model is used to guide the 
simulation to explore scenarios of interest instead of a wide-scale exploration. The 
software guidance model interacts with the high-level planner and scheduler to better 
estimate the total system risk.  
The software behavior model is a combination of a deterministic model and stochastic 





well as the interaction between the software and other parts of the system. The 
stochastic model is superimposed onto the deterministic model to represent the 
uncertain behavior of the software, e.g., software failures. Finite State Machine (FSM) 
is chosen to build the deterministic behavior model. Finite state machine has been 
defined as: “a computational model consisting of a finite number of states and 
transitions between these states, possibly with accompanying actions” [5, 6]. 
Simulation-based Finite State Machine (SFSM) is defined by adding simulation-
related components to traditional FSM. Multiple controllable variables are defined in 
the behavior model including simulation level of detail, software failure injection, 
failure level of detail. The values of the variables are controlled by the guidance 
model. 
The guidance model adjusts the behavior model based on the requirements from the 
high-level scheduler and planner. Meanwhile, the software guidance model also 
provides information to update the planner. An adaptive guidance rule is designed in 
the high-level planner, scheduler and the software guidance model to adjust the 
software simulation level of detail to the appropriate level for different scenarios 
based on simulation result and prior knowledge. It is demonstrated that this increases 
the simulation efficiency and mitigates the state explosion problem in dynamic PRA.  
A complete procedure to build the software representation and integrate the software 
representation into SimPRA environment is provided. Figure 1 presents an overview 





















Figure 1 Overview of the software representation in SimPRA environment 
1.4 Content 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the related work and motivation for this research. 
Software modeling in classical PRA and dynamic PRA are also introduced. The 
difference in modeling methodologies between traditional PRA environment and 
Dynamic PRA environment is described. The SimPRA environment is reviewed. 
Chapter 3 summarizes the software modeling requirements in dynamic PRA 
environment. The requirements are discussed in terms of general modeling 
requirements, simulation requirements, interaction requirements, and non-functional 
requirements. 
Chapter 4 presents the proposed software representation methodology, based on the 
software modeling requirements.  The software behavior model and guidance model 





The integration of the software representation into the SimPRA environment is 
described in Chapter 5. This includes a detailed description of the adaptive scheduling 
in SimPRA environment. The state explosion problem in dynamic PRA environment 
is described and possible approaches to mitigate it are discussed.  A new multi-level 
simulation based approach is proposed. The necessary modification to the SimPRA 
environment is summarized. The detailed integration procedure is presented at the 
end of the chapter. 
Chapter 6 describes the implementation of the software representation on a parallel 
system. The methodology has been applied to the benchmark problem proposed for 
an invited session on advanced PRA methods in PSAM 2006. The benchmark 
problem is a Propulsion System Mission and Design Problem proposed by NASA 
headquarters.  
Chapter 7 presents an application of the methodology for a Personnel Access Control 
System (PACS). PACS is a relatively complex system with human, software and 
hardware involved. A complete system model is developed. The integration process is 
discussed. A 3-level software abstraction is defined. The model is then used in the 
modified SimPRA software to generate risk scenarios and corresponding probabilities. 
At the end of the chapter, a comparison between using the classical PRA 
methodology and dynamic PRA methodology are summarized using this example. 
Chapter 8 develops a procedure to establish a consistently quantified software model 
when code is available and objective test data can be obtained.  
Chapter 9 concludes this dissertation by highlighting the contribution and also the 





1.5 Summary of Research Contributions 
The significant contributions of this dissertation are as follows: 
1. Development of a software representation for dynamic PRA environment: 
This research is the first effort to develop a methodology to systematically 
identify software contributions to the system risk in a dynamic PRA 
environment. Since the methodology is built on current PRA techniques and 
since a tool is provided, it is expected that PRA practitioners should find it 
easy to use and understand. 
2. Development of a methodology for simulating multi-level objects in the 
dynamic PRA environment: This is a new methodology to address the state 
explosion problem in simulation-based dynamic PRA methodologies. Our 
results indicate that the use of the proposed approach improves the DPRA 
simulation performance. 
3. Enhancement of the simulation based dynamic PRA (SimPRA) environment. 
SimPRA is more complete PRA modeling environment with the addition of 
the software model. An easy to use tool is developed for the end user. The 
methods development and tool enhancements achieved in this research are 
significant steps forward in improving capabilities for conducting risk analysis 
of complex systems, particularly those offered by dynamic PRA 
methodologies. The modeling procedures and tools proposed here also help in 






Chapter 2: Background 
2.1 Software modeling in classical PRA 
PRA has been applied to large complex systems for over 30 years. It is required as 
part of the risk management process in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) and National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA). 
The first full scale application of PRA methods was the Reactor Safety Study WASH-
1400 [7]. Since its completion in 1975, NRC has been exploring ways of 
systematically applying PRA to nuclear plants. A “PRA procedure guide” was 
developed by NRC in 1983 in the background of increasing application of PRA 
methods within the nuclear industry and the regulatory process. This guide describes 
the principal methods used in PRA and provides general guidance for performing 
PRAs for nuclear power plants [8].  
NASA instituted a number of programs for PRA analysis after the Challenger 
accident in 1986 [9]. After the extensive review of NASA safety policy, NASA 
managers decided to use PRA as one of the bases for the support of decisions 
regarding improvements in Space Shuttle safety. Office of Safety and Mission 
Assurance at NASA headquarters published several handbooks to enhance the PRA 
expertise at NASA [10]. Software tools such as QRAS have been designed to 
automate the PRA analysis procedure [11]. 





consequence is that one of the major potential causes of safety-critical system failures 
is not included in the analysis. 
Some related research has been conducted in recent years. But the focus has been 
mostly on the software risk assessment itself rather than as an integral part of the 
PRA super-structure [12-14].  A literature review for the recent work is found in [15]. 
We briefly summarize it below. 
Dugan [13] used fault trees for software reliability analysis. Lutz [14] investigated the 
use of fault trees to study the root causes of safety-related software errors in safety-
critical embedded systems. The research results are used to identify methods by 
which requirements errors can be prevented.  
A risk index factor has been developed by Lee to quantify the risk associated with 
individual software components in programs developed for space flight applications 
[16]. The risk index attempts to quantify the risk, utilizing the results from software 
complexity analysis, the evaluation of test coverage, and a failure modes and effects 
analysis.  
Schneidewind’s model [17] was used to quantify the reliability of the shuttle’s on-
board system software. Ammarrt [12] presented a methodology of risk assessment of 
functional-requirement specifications for complex real-time software systems using a 
heuristic risk assessment technique based on CPN (colored Petri-net) models. Yacoub 
[18] presents a methodology for risk assessment at the architectural level by 
developing heuristic risk factors for architectural elements using complexity factors 
and severity. These studies stay at the software component level without 





Li’s study is the first step towards a systematic approach to integrating software into a 
traditional PRA framework [1-3]. This framework of integrating software into the 
traditional PRA environment follows the standard PRA procedure. 
The so-called test-based approach has been designed to integrate software 
contributions into PRA analysis [3]. Using this approach, software related failures 
need to be identified first. A software-related failure modes taxonomy has been 
established and validated by Li [2]. Once the software-related failure modes have 
been identified, the system- and software-related functions need to be identified in the 
system failure scenarios. The input tree and output tree need to be defined per 
function and per scenario. The basic procedure of Li’s approach is: 
1. Identify events/components controlled/supported by software in MLD, accident 
scenarios, fault trees; 
2. Specify the functions involved; 
3. Model software function in Event Sequence Diagram (ESD), or Event Tree (ET), 
and fault trees; 
4. Identify (i.e., estimate probability of) the input tree; 
5. Quantify the input tree; 
6. Develop and perform software safety tests; 
7. Build and quantify the output tree. 
The test-based approach has several limitations.  
First, the methodology is test based; therefore it assumes the availability of source 
code. Also it precludes risk analysis during other software life-cycle phases. An 





source-code stage.  
Second, the testing is performed at the software-component level, implying that the 
risk scenarios should also model the software at that level. That may not produce 
sufficient detail in some risk analyses. Modifications are required to study the 
software at a lower level.  
The third limitation is that the analyst is still responsible for identifying the risk 
scenarios, as well as the input and output tree. The quality of the risk assessment 
depends greatly on the analyst. Meanwhile, if the software needs to be studied at a 
lower level, software-failure propagation will become a major obstacle for the analyst 
in exploring all the possible risk scenarios.  
The final limitation is the quality of the software operational profile. A profile is 
defined as a set of disjoint (only one can occur at a time) alternatives with the 
probability that each will occur [19]. The detailed software operational profile is 
essential to the final risk assessment quality in the traditional PRA framework. In the 
test-based approach, the functional profile needs to be defined for each function in 
each scenario. In a complex hybrid system, obtaining a detailed functional profile is 
usually very time-consuming and costly. The analyst needs to strike a balance 
between the degree of profile detail and the final cost, which also limits the final risk-
assessment quality.  
2.2 Dynamic PRA environment 





scenarios of complex systems. The essence of this approach is the probabilistic 
simulation of the dynamic behavior of the system using the models of the system 
elements and rules of their internal and external interactions. Due to the fact that risk 
scenario generation in DPRA is more detailed, and context-rich, it is generally 
believed that software can be more realistically modeled in such framework. A 
literature review for different DPRA methodologies is found in [4, 20]. We briefly 
summarize it below. 
Amendola proposed an approach to incorporate process dynamics with stochastic 
transitions in 1981 [21].  After that, different approaches have been attempted to 
solve the DPRA problems. 
Some research proposes extensions to include the dynamic feathers in the traditional 
ET/FT methods [22, 23]. Others introduced graphic tools to capture the dynamic 
feathers, such as Petri-Net [24-26], Dynamic Flowgraph [27], Go-Flow [28], and 
Dynamic Event Sequence Diagram [29-31]. The mathematic framework was 
proposed for probabilistic dynamics by several researchers [32, 33]. The close form 
analytical solution is hard to find for large systems using DPRA methodologies. The 
simulation-based methods present great potential to solve DPRA problems. 
The simulation-based DPRA methodology provides a framework for explicitly 
capturing the influence of time and process dynamics on risk scenarios. Using the 
DPRA approach, a formal representation of the system behavior needs to be 
constructed for the hardware, software, and human components. A set of rules needs 
to be prescribed to systematically decompose the system. The executable model is 





place in the system, as a function of time. The event sequences are generated 
automatically by controlling the stochastic events in the model, such as hardware, 
software, and human failures. Each sequence represents a unique combination of 
timing and occurrence of the stochastic events. The system vulnerabilities, defined as 
the elements inside the system that could bring the system to an undesirable state, are 
identified, using the sequence simulation results. This significantly reduces the need 
for specialized risk models developed by the analyst, thus closing the gap between the 
design and risk assessment process. 
Current DPRA frameworks largely rely on two strategies, which are referred to as 
systematic exploration (Discrete Dynamic Event Tree Simulation) and random 
exploration (Continuous Event Tree Simulation). The Discrete Dynamic Event Tree 
(DDET) methods systematically explore a large number of scenarios by introducing, 
at set points in time, branch points whose branches represent distinct courses of 
events, thus leading to distinct sequences of events. All possible branches of the 
system evolution are simulated systematically [34, 35]. Continuous Event Tree (CET) 
simulation does not involve the discretization of the event sequence space. The event 
sequences are randomly generated by randomly deciding on the occurrence and 
timing of events. Biasing techniques are typically applied in the DPRA approaches 
based on CET simulation [36, 37].  
DPRA is considered to be the next generation of PRA techniques. The technique is 
not currently in use because of the state explosion problem, which needs resolution, 
and because some components, such as software and human behavior, are currently 





state explosion solutions makes DPRA a more practical PRA technique. However, the 
software model still needs to be systematically studied, and new solutions are still 
needed to mitigate the state explosion problem. 
There is no generally accepted software presentation methodology in DPRA 
environment. Most DPRA methodologies either neglect the software contribution to 
the system risk in comparison to hardware component contributions, or treat the 
software component in the same way as hardware components. Software failures 
however are in general the result of faults or flaws possibly introduced in the logic of 
the software design, or in the code-implementation of that logic. These may or may 
not produce an actual functional failure, depending on whether or not they are found 
by an execution path activated according to the specific inputs to the software that 
drive the execution at a specific time [10].  
Thus, software contribution to the system risk is highly input condition depended. 
The relationship between software failures and different input conditions should be 
modeled inside the DPRA environment. 
2.3 SimPRA environment 
2.3.1 Introduction 
An adaptive-scheduling simulation-based DPRA environment has been developed at 
the University of Maryland [38, 39]. Entropy-based biasing techniques are used to 
adaptively guide the simulation towards events and end-states of interest. The prior 





dynamically adjust the exploration rules in the DPRA environment. That approach 
has been demonstrated in a computer code implementation known as SimPRA 
(Simulation-based PRA). See [38]. 
In SimPRA, a high-level simulation scheduler is constructed to control the simulation 
process, generally by controlling the occurrence of the random events inside the 
system model. To stimulate the desired types of scenarios, the input to the simulation 
model is also controlled, using scheduling algorithms. Rather than using a generic 
wide-scale exploration, the scheduler is able to pick up the important scenarios, which 
are essential to the final system risk, thus increasing the simulation efficiency.  To do 
that, a high-level simulation planner is constructed to guide the scheduler to simulate 
the scenarios of interest. Figure 2 is an overview structure of the adaptive-scheduling 
simulation-based DPRA environment. 
 
Figure 2: Structure of the adaptive scheduling DPRA environment [38] 
2.3.2 Software Representation in DPRA 
Software modeling in the DPRA environment differs from the traditional PRA 
environment. The analyst no longer needs to study the fault propagation and 





building an executable software model and identifying possible software-related 
initiating events. The simulation environment will explore the scenario space, based 
on the system model, which includes model of the hardware, human and software 
elements. In this approach an executable software model first needs to be constructed 
to simulate the software behaviors. The software-related failure modes need to be 
identified similarly, as in the traditional PRA framework. The selected failure modes 
will be superimposed on the executable behavior model as stochastic events. The 
software-related failures are controlled by the simulation guidance model during 
simulation, based on the predefined rules for exploring the risk-scenarios space, 
following the selected initiating events. 
Based on the above description, the software representation in the adaptive-
scheduling DPRA environment should include both a behavior model and a software 
guidance model. The behavior model is an executable model. It will be plugged into 
the system environment to simulate the software behavior. It should be able to capture 
all phenomena that fall within the scope of the analysis. The software guidance model 
guides the simulation to explore scenarios of interest instead of a wide-scale 
exploration. The software guidance model should also interact with the high-level 
planner and scheduler to better estimate the total system risk. See Figure 1 
The software representation is established based on the information available. The 
following assumptions and limitations are implied in this dissertation: 
• Basic information about the software is obtainable. 
• The software model can only be built based on information available. It can 





• The software model is not guaranteed to be correct once the information is 
limited. But the software model can be refined once the analyst gets more 
information. 
2.4 Teamwork 
The research of SimPRA environment is a teamwork result. All team members 
contribute their individual efforts to make this research come true. The whole team 
includes Professor Ali Mosleh, Dr. Frank Greon, Dr. Yunwei Hu, Hamed Nejad, 
Thiago Tinoco Pires, and me. My contribution to this research includes designing the 
software model, implementing the software representation in SimPRA, developing a 
methodology to simulate multi-level objects, and enhancing current SimPRA 
environment to simulate multi-level objects. Figure 3 presents a teamwork chart to 



























Figure 3. Teamwork chart for SimPRA 
2.5 Glossary of terms 
The following terms are used in this dissertation: 
1. Model: an abstraction of the real-life system. Models are used to obtain 
predictions of the behavior of real system, especially how one or more 
changes in various aspects of the modeled system would affect the other 
aspects of the system. [38, 40] 





defined as an instantaneous occurrence that changes the system configuration. 
[41] 
a. Random Events are the events whose occurrences are depicted by a 
stochastic model and can be controlled by the simulation environment. 
b. Deterministic Events are induced by the deterministic rules. 
3. Scheduling: the process of controlling the generation of event sequences. It is 
done by deciding on the occurrence and timing of the random events in the 
model.  
4. Branch Point: a point in the simulation of the system at which the occurrence 
of a random event is considered by the algorithm controlling the simulation. 
Each branch point will have two or more branches, corresponding to 
occurrence of possible events.  
5. End State: a classification of the condition of the system at the end of an event 
sequence. 
6. Scenario: One simulation realization as a sequence of events from the 
Initiating Event (IE) to one End State (ES). 
7. One round of simulation: One round of simulation is defined as a specific 
number of scenarios generated before updating the plan. In other words, it is 
the number of event sequences of one updating interval 
8. Plan updating interval: The planner is part of SimPRA. It serves as a map for 
exploration. The scenarios of interest are highlighted in the planner. The map 





Chapter 3: Software Modeling Requirements in DPRA 
This chapter describes the basic requirements that a successful integration of software 
behavior models in DPRA must meet. 
3.1 General Modeling Requirement 
From a general modeling perspective, the software model should be: 
 　 Simple in methodology 
 　 Easy to learn. The basic modeling concept should be easy to understand 
 　 Easy to use, with acceptable modeling costs 
 　 Quickly and seamlessly developed  
 　 Accompanied with a tool to help end users build the model 
 　 Easily and economically maintained and modified 
 　 Reusable 
3.2 Simulation Requirements 
From the simulation perspective, there are different requirements for the behavior 
model and the guidance model. The software behavior model should have the 
following characteristics: 
 Complete. Since the model needs to capture all phenomena that fall within 





most (ideally, all) of the software systems and software characteristics as 
they relate to risk assessment.  
 Executable and linkable. The behavior model should be executable and 
linkable with other elements, such as humans and hardware, inside the 
DPRA framework. This is a basic requirement of the simulation 
environment. 
 Hierarchical. First the model should have a hierarchical structure from the 
lines of code to the coarser-grained software model. Meanwhile, different 
levels of abstraction should also be defined to simulate the software behavior 
at each level. Secondly one needs to model the software at different stages of 
the software development life-cycle: requirement, design and code. The 
modeling method should be usable at various stages and should also be 
updatable as the analysts get more information about the real software. 
 Flexible. The level of the abstraction should be flexible and controlled by the 
simulation scheduler. As was specified in the hierarchical requirements, 
different levels of abstraction should be constructed, and the scheduler 
should be able to flexibly control the simulation level of detail, based on the 
different simulation requirements. 
 Controllable Stochastic Events. The behavior model is a combination of 
deterministic model and stochastic model. Stochastic events represent 
possible software failures inside the behavior model. The latter should be 
controllable by the software scheduler and the high-level system scheduler. 





of possible software faults. 
 Explorable. The simulation scheduler should be able to perform a systematic 
exploration of the software model behavior. 
The software guidance model is designed to guide the simulation to explore scenarios 
of interest. It also interacts with the high-level simulation scheduler to automatically 
adjust the software level of detail used in the simulation, based on prior knowledge 
and previous simulation results. To fit into the DRPA simulation environment, the 
guidance model should: 
 Capture common software vulnerabilities 
 Include a software scheduler to control the stochastic events inside the behavior 
model 
 Adjust the software simulation rules, based on prior simulation results 
 Adjust the software simulation rules, upon requests from the high-level system 
simulation scheduler 
3.3 Interaction Requirements 
Modern safety-critical systems are usually X-ware systems [42]. The systems consist 
of interacting X-ware components of hardware, software, and human operators. 
Software components thus interact with hardware, and human components within the 
simulation environment. Therefore, we should also establish the software model 
requirements from an interaction perspective.  





relation to certain functions. It results in the exchange of matter, energy, force, and/or 
information [42]. The system functions are achieved via the interactions of 
components. As there are three types of components in X-ware systems (hardware, 
software, and human), the interactions between any two components need to be 
studied separately. 
Software-Software interactions 
Interaction between two software takes place via information exchange. The 
information can be categorized into value-related information and time-related 
information [43].  
 Value-related information 
 Amount: the total number or quantity of input or output 
 Value: The value taken by the input or output 
 Range: the limits of input/output’s quantities. 
 Type: a set of data with values having defined characteristics 
 Time-related information 
 Time: the point at which the ith input/output element is available or feeds 
into/out of the software 
 Rate: the frequency at which the input is sent or the output is received 
 Duration: the time period during which the input or the output lasts 
 Load: the quantity that can be carried at one time by a specified input or 
output medium 





representation should also have the capability to model all value-related failure modes 
as well as time-related failure modes. 
Software-Hardware interactions 
Software interaction with hardware can be simplified as an information exchange. 
Software obtains hardware-state information and then sends command signals to the 
hardware. From this perspective, this interaction is similar to a software-software 
interaction. Both value-related failure modes and time-related failure modes need to 
be considered. 
The hardware can also act as a support medium for software, such as memory, CPU, 
etc. In that sense, support failure modes should also be modeled inside the software 
representation.  
Software-Human interactions 
For complex, critical, and reliability-demanding operating environments, the 
software/human interaction is equally important. Information related to human 
detection can be divided into the following categories: visual detection, auditory 
detection, olfactory detection, and tactual detection. Tactual detection and olfactory 
detection usually invoke human/hardware interactions. When considering 
human/software interaction, we usually need to consider the following characteristics: 
• Auditory interaction 
Spectrum; Frequency; Amplitude; Relative intensity 





Overall layout; Position; Distance; Size; Color; Contrast; Brightness; Flash rate 
These characteristics need to be added to the software output to human as additional 
factors. Different value of these factors can influence human detection capability to 
software output. These factors can be represented using value-related information and 
time-related information. For instance, the relationship between distance and human 
movement time can be modeled using Fitts’ Law [44]. The movement time can be 
future used in the human model to predict the performance of operators using 
complex system. Fitts’ law is stated as follows:  
MT = a + b log2(2A/W)        (3.1) 
where  
• MT = movement time  
• a,b = regression coefficients  
• A = distance of movement from start to target center  
• W = width of the target  
3.4 Non-Functional Requirements 
A non-functional requirement is defined as a software requirement that describes not 
what the software will do, but how the software will do it, as in for example, software 
performance requirements, software external interface requirements, software design 
constraints, and software quality attributes. [43] Nonfunctional requirements are 
difficult to test; therefore, they are usually evaluated subjectively. 





capture the related non-functional requirements, which can be summarized in the 
following categories: 
 Design constraints: 
 cost and delivery date  
 development process to be used 
 platform 
 accuracy requirements 
 interface requirement: describe how the system is to interface with its 
environment, users, and other systems. (e.g., user interfaces) and their 
qualities (e.g., user-friendliness) 
 response time: the time that elapses from when a user issues a command to 
when the system provides enough results for the user to continue to work  
 throughput: computations or transactions per minute 
 technology to be used 
 resource usage 
 Lifecycle requirements 
 flexibility: the ability to handle requirement changes 
 installability: ease of system installation 
 operability: ease of everyday operation 
 allowance for maintainability and enhancement 
 allowance for reusability: describes the percentage of the system, measured 
in lines of code, that must be designed generically, so that it can be reused 





system is running and able to provide services to its users  
 robustness, recovery from failure 
 reliability: an important quality of software that measures the frequency of 
failures, as encountered by testers and end-users  
 security requirements 
 portability: the capacity to be moved to different platforms or operating 
systems 
 Other requirements 
 economic requirements 
 organization requirements 
 political requirements 
Among all these requirements, we need to consider the requirements related to 
software behavior and system risk. From that perspective, we mainly consider design 
constraints, including the following: 
• platform;  
• accuracy requirements;  
• interface requirements;  
• response time;  
• throughput; resource usage 
The non-functional requirements should be captured inside the behavior model. The 
simulation environment should have the capability to simulate different overload 






In this chapter, the software modeling-requirements in the DPRA environment are 
summarized from different perspectives.  
The simulation requirements are basic requirements imposed by the simulation 
environment. The software representation developed in this dissertation meets the 
simulation requirements. The software methodology should be able to model all time-
related information and value-related information in order to model the interaction 
requirements and the non-functional requirements. The methodology developed in the 
following chapter ensures the integration of value-related information and time-
related information. It is the author’s belief that general modeling requirements are 
met. A modeling tool is developed for software representation that is easy to learn, 





Chapter 4: Software Representation Framework for simulation 
4.1 Overview 
Among the available methodologies for modeling software behavior are: finite-state 
charts [6], UML [45], Petri-Net[46], and pattern concepts [47]. Those methods, and 
others, fall into one of two broad categories: 1) those based on software data flow, 
representing the software through decomposition of the system into dataflow 
diagrams that capture the successive transformations of system input into system 
output, and 2) those that model the procedural stages of the software, represented in 
the form of states and transitions between those states, leading to a finite-state chart. 
Because of its ability to model reactive systems, the latter seems appropriate for our 
purpose.  
Table 1 compares some existing software representations with respect to the 
modeling requirements: 








Pattern No No NA No No Good TBD Yes NA 
UML Engine 
required 
No NA No TBD Fair TBD Partially Available





Partially Yes No Yes TBD Good TBD Partially Available





Table 1 shows that two of the criteria can not be assessed since completeness can 
never be fully proven. No experimental evidence exists which would allow us to 
conclude on the respective ease of use of the modeling approaches considered. Thus 
we conclude based on the remaining factors that FSM best fits our purpose.  
FSM has been defined as: A computational model consisting of a finite number of 
states and transitions between these states, possibly with accompanying actions [5]. 
FSM accepts input events (or stimuli) that cause an output (or action) and possibly a 
change in state. Both the output actions and the next state of the machine are pure 
functions of input event and current state. Transitions can be separated into two parts: 
conditions and transitions. Transitions are triggered when the conditions are true.  
There are two concepts of states. 1) A condition or mode of existence that a system, 
component, or simulation may be in; and 2) the values assumed at a given instant by 
the variables that define the characteristics of a system, component, or simulation.  
The concept of simulation-based Finite State Machine (SFSM) is defined in the 
following sections. The model is based on FSM but integrates all the simulation-
required components.  
4.2 Key Concept 
The following concepts will to be used in the sections that follow.  
1) Multi-Layer Software Representation 
The software representation is defined during different stages of the software 





starting with the requirement specification and continuing through the design 
specification and coding stages. The software representation is refined after more 
information becomes available. At any given time point in the software-
development life cycle, the software representation also has a multi-level structure. 
(See next definition, below.) 
2) Multi-Level Software Representation 
The multi-level abstractions may be viewed as a hierarchical structure of software 
representations from the lines of code to the coarser-grained software model. The 
level of detail used in simulation is dynamically adjusted, based on the different 
simulation requirements. 



















Figure 4. Relationship between the Multi-Layer structure and the Multi-Level structure 
3) Failure Modes 
Failure modes fm are defined as the observable typically functional ways in which a 
system, a component, an operator, a piece of software, or a process can fail. All the 
failure modes considered in this dissertation belong to the pre-defined failure modes 
set.  
msm Ff ∈          (4.1) 
4) Failure Sets 
Failure-mode Sets Fms is simply a set of failure modes. A pre-defined failure-mode set 
is defined in the following sections. 
{ }mnmmms fffF ,,, 21 L=        (4.2) 
5) Stochastic Failures 
Stochastic failures are the real failures injected at random, and according to a 
stochastic model, in the software behavior model. Each stochastic failure is a 
realization of a selected failure mode. Each failure has the following attributes: 
 Failure location 
 Failure mode 
 Stochastic properties (e.g., occurrence probabilities) 
6) Abstraction 
Abstraction techniques are defined as techniques that derive simpler representations 
while maintaining the validity of the simulation results with respect to the questions 





into three broad techniques: model boundary modification, model behavior 
modification and model form modification [48] [49]. Model boundary modification 
refers to the modification of the input variable space. Model behavior modification 
involves modification of behaviors within a model rather than the inputs to a model. 
Model form modification refers to modification of model form, characterized by a 
simplication of the input-output transformation within a model or model component.  
In this research, functional abstraction and continuous abstraction are defined for 
software abstraction based on the nature of software. Functional abstraction is an 
abstraction of the discrete structure of the software. Functional abstraction can be 
defined for all high-level functions. However, the lowest level function can not be 
abstracted in this way. Functional abstraction is a mixed modification of model 
boundary modification and model behavior modification. 
Continuous abstraction is a mathematical abstraction of the continuous behavior of 
basic functions. For instance, a complex equation using physical quantities, such as 
temperature and pressure, i.e. continuous variables, can be abstracted using a look-up 
table. Continuous abstraction focuses on model form modification.  
7) Functional Abstraction vs. Functional Decomposition 
Functional decomposition is a methodology used to break down complex systems 
into low-level tasks or functions. A hierarchical function tree can be constructed 
using the functional decomposition methodology. Functional abstraction is an abstract 
description of high-level functions in the function tree. Use of functional abstraction 





4.3 Behavior Model 
4.3.1 Overview 
The behavior model is designed to capture all possible software behavior within the 
scope of analysis. The real software is used directly in the previously mentioned test-
based methodology proposed for the classical PRA framework. Clearly, the software 
itself could also be used as the behavior model in the DPRA environment. But using 
the software directly in the simulation environment may be unacceptable for any of 
the following reasons: 
1) The software code is not available. 
2) Software development is still in the requirement stage or the design stage. 
3) The execution of the real software is time-consuming, which makes it 
unacceptable for the purpose of simulation. 
Software failures include requirement and implementation failures. Both types are 
naturally included if the real software is used directly as the behavior model. There 
are no controllable variables, so the software representation is merely a software-
behavior model. The software model gets inputs from the simulation environment and 
provides outputs to hardware and human models. 
In most cases the software-behavior model needs to be constructed separately by the 
analyst. The behavior model can be constructed from the information available and 
then refined after the analyst receives more information about the software. The 
analyst may start with the information available from the software requirement 





software, the less uncertainty there will be in the final risk estimation, since the 
representation is a more accurate description of reality.   
When the real software is not available, abstraction needs to be made to construct the 
behavior model based on the information available. As stated earlier, abstraction 
could be done at different levels, making the software representation a multi-level 
software representation. Considering the following functional decomposition of the 
software (Figure 5), an abstraction (the shaded blocks) could be done at function level 
F1 or function level F11. The abstraction will lead to omission of details related to 
sub-functions. For instance, if the abstraction of function F1 is activated, all the sub-
functions F11, F12, etc are disabled automatically. 
Root
F1 F2 F3 Fn
.........
F11 F12 ... F1m
... ... ... ...
Lowest level
Fn1 Fn2 ... Fnl
... ... ... ...
 
Figure 5. Software functional decomposition 
The behavior model is an executable model. The deterministic behavior of the 





if the information is not accurate, but it can be reduced when the analyst receives 
more information. The abstraction can be defined at different functional levels. The 
behavior needs to be clearly defined for each level of abstraction.  
Consider, for example, a software system LOCAT1 which calculates the projectile’s 
coordinates. LOCAT receives real-time t from the TRAC hardware and computes the 
corresponding (x, y) Cartesian coordinates and outputs the results. The highest logic 
level system diagram is illustrated in Figure 6. 
TRAC
Hardware LOCAT OUTPUTt x,y
TRAC system
 
Figure 6. The highest logic level system diagram for LOCAT 
LOCAT is composed of sub-functions realtimeCalculation and outputResult. Sub-
function realtimeCalculation can be further decomposed to sub-functions get_time 
and cal_coordinate. Sub-function get_time retrieves time information from TRAC 
hardware and validates the time received from TRAC hardware. Sub-function 
cal_coordinate calculates x,y coordinates for the given time. Sub-function 
outputResult outputs the results to the external device. 
                                                 
1 . The software is a part of a real-time simple projectile tracking system for the Army’s all weather Doppler radar 









Figure 7. Example Software System LOCAT 
The abstraction behavior has been defined for function LOCAT, also for sub-function 
realtimeCalculation. In this system the software function LOCAT can be modeled at 
the abstraction level of LOCAT or at the lower abstraction levels realtimeCalculation 
and outputResult, or at the detailed levels getTime, calCoordinate, outputResult. For 
each level, the detailed behavior needs to be defined deterministically. The level of 
detail is controlled by the software guidance model during simulation. Error is 
introduced when simulating at a high-level, but can be eliminated when simulating at 
the lowest level. 
The software behavior model is constructed, based on an expected software behavior 
that omits all the failures introduced during software implementation. The 
implementation failures should be modeled also as stochastic events. The detailed 
failure information should be simulated in the abstraction model during simulation. 
The software failures can be injected at the selected level. The software function 
outputs are influenced by the failures, even when the detailed locations of the 





side of the functions in our models.  
Considering the example LOCAT system in Figure 7, from the information available 
we know that some faults exist in the function block getTime and the function block 
outputResult.  The detailed fault location, however, is not available. Accordingly, the 
software failures can be injected at the output side of LOCAT, or at the output side of 
getTime and outputResult, or at the output side of getTime and outputResult. The 
detailed injection rules are discussed in the guidance model section (section 4.4). The 
failure injection level differs from the abstraction level. Even if the software is 
simulated at the lowest level getTime, calCoordinate, outputResult, the failure can 
still be injected at the output side of function LOCAT.  
In this sense the software-behavior model is a combination of a deterministic model 
and a stochastic model. The deterministic model is used to simulate the behavior of 
the software, as well as the interaction between the software and other parts of the 
system. The stochastic model should be superimposed onto the deterministic model to 
represent the uncertain behavior of the software, e.g., software failures. 
4.3.2 Simulation-based Finite State Machine (SFSM) 
The software-behavior model is built using the FSM notation established by Harel 
[6]. The simulation-based concept is built into the basic FSM to form the SFSM. 
The machine will be built using Matlab/Simulink [50]. Stateflow toolbox has been 
used to build the SFSM for our application software.  
MATLAB, a very powerful tool designed by MathWorks, integrates mathematical 





for technical computing. The open architecture makes it easy to use MATLAB and its 
companion products to explore data, create algorithms, and create custom tools that 
provide early insights and competitive advantages.  
Simulink, a toolbox extension of Matlab, is an interactive tool for modeling, 
simulating, and analyzing dynamic, multi-domain systems. It allows the user 
accurately describe, simulate, evaluate, and refine a system’s behavior through 
standard and custom block libraries.  Simulink integrates seamlessly with MATLAB, 
providing immediate access to an extensive range of analysis and design tools.  
Simulink is a very good tool for control-system design, signal-processing system 
design, communications-system design, and other simulation applications. Stateflow 
is another toolbox for MATLAB. It is a graphical design and development tool for 
simulating complex reactive systems based on FSM theory. Stateflow and simulink 
together will be used to construct a software representation for our examples.  
Some key notions of SFSM are defined in the following: 
[State] 
State is defined as a condition or mode of existence that a system, component, 
or simulation may be in [5]. A state can be dissected into sub-states. There are 
two types of states: exclusive state and parallel state. Exclusive states are used 
for the software models that are mutually exclusive. Parallel states are used to 
model parallel software, which means that two or more states can be active at 
the same time [50]. 
States have labels that can specify actions executed in a sequence based upon 





“Entry” action is executed when the state is entered. “During” action is 
executed when the system stays in the state. “Exit” action is executed when 
the system exit the state. “On event” action is executed when the given event 
occurs and the system stays in the state.  
[Transition] 
Transition can be separated into two parts: the conditions and the transitions. 
The transitions are triggered when the conditions are true. Actions can be 
associated with both conditions and transitions. Transitions are not 
decomposable, and all of the transition is executed instantaneously.  
[Action] 
Actions can be associated with states, conditions, or transitions. An action can 
be a function call, the broadcast of an event, the assignment of a value to a 
variable. It can be served as an interface to load the real software. 
[Internal Variables] 
Internal variables are defined inside the SFSM. They will be used to describe 
the internal states of the software. They are also used to define control 
information for the guidance model. 
The basic concept of the SFSM is discussed above. Simulation-based elements are 
added in the following sections. 
4.3.3 Deterministic Model 
Construction of the deterministic model is based on the information available. Multi-





development life cycle. Construction of the behavior model can be based on the 
software-requirement document, the software-design document, and the software 
code. The model is continually refined as more information becomes available. 
Given the available information, the behavior model is also a multi-level model. 
Multi-level abstraction is defined for selected functions which meet the following 
criteria: 
1) The execution of the functions is time-consuming (during simulation), and 
2) The selected functions are not important for certain scenarios. 
Different function blocks have different simulation priorities. The simulation level of 
detail may be different for different sub-function blocks. Even for the same function 
block, the priority changes in different contexts. The software guidance model 
(section 4.4) dynamically adjusts the simulation level of detail.  
The simulation level of detail is defined as an internal variable. The simulation 
environment controls the values of the internal variables. The software is executed at 






Figure 8. Typical structure used to control the level of model detail used in simulation 
An abstraction knowledge base (AKB) needs to be defined before the simulation. A 
tree structure is used to construct the AKB (See Figure 9). Use of high-level 
abstraction will automatically disable all the low-level abstraction. The reason is 
obvious; the use of “Abstract_Model” (see Figure 8) disables all details in the 
software state “Detail_Model”. 
Root
Abstraction 1 Abstraction n...
Abstraction 11 Abstraction 1n...
... ... ...
 
Figure 9. Abstraction Knowledge Base 
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function; the index value for Root is always 0; 
fi represents the function name in the functional-decomposition structure (see  
Figure 5); 
fl represents the function level in the functional-decomposition structure (see  
Figure 5); 
Np represents the parent node of the current node; the value is -1 for the Root 
node; 
Ncj represents the child nodes of the current node; the value is -1 if there is no 
child node available; 
n represents the number of child nodes of the current node. 
Only the structure-related information is stored in AKB. The simulation-related 
information about the abstraction level of detail is stored in a separate knowledge 
base. The detail of this knowledge base is introduced in the guidance model (section 
4.4). 
Considering the software example in Figure 5, the tree structure of AKB can be 




0, Root, 0, -1, {1,2}
1, F1, 1, 0, {3,4}
2, Fn2, n, 0, {-1}
3, F11, 2, 1, {-1}






Figure 10. AKB for software example in Figure 5 
The nodes of the AKB tree are described on the right side of Figure 10. 
4.3.4 Stochastic Model 
The stochastic model simulates the uncertain behavior of the software, e.g., software 
failures. Uncertain behavior should be controlled by the software scheduler and the 
high-level system scheduler. Using this mechanism, the simulation environment can 
simulate the implementation failures in the real software and analyze their impact on 
the whole system. 
Failure Modes 
Failure modes are defined as the observable ways in which a system, a component, an 
operator, a piece of software, or a process can fail. A taxonomy of software-related 
failure modes has been proposed in [4]. Software failures may originate either within 
the software itself or from the software interface with its operational environment. 
Failure modes, therefore, can be classified as either software functional-failure modes 
(failure modes of the software itself) or software interaction-failure modes 
(input/output failure modes, support-failure modes and environmental-impact factors). 
In this research, input/output (I/O) failure modes are considered first. The I/O failure 
modes include value-related failure modes (amount, value, range and type) and time-
related failure modes (time, rate, duration and load). Function failure modes generate 





The effect of a support failure2 will be covered in future research. The definition of 
the following failure mode set is based on the above information. 
[ ] [ ]},,,,,,,{ loaddurationratetimeTtyperangeamountvalueTF tvs =   (4.4) 
The above set is used as a pre-defined generic failure-mode set in this research. 
The value-related failure model uses the SFSM structure in Figure 11: 
 
Figure 11. Value-related failure modeling in SFSM 
Time related failures are complex, compared with value-related failures. Figure 12 
presents the structure used for modeling a delay failure. Figure 13 shows the structure 
for the delay unit. 
                                                 
2 The “support” failure modes include failures due to competition for computing resource and the computing 
platform physical features. The failure modes due to resource competition are deadlock and lockout. The impact of 







Figure 12. Delay failure modeling in SFSM 
 
Figure 13. Delay component for time-related failure in SFSM 





the integration of the software model into the SimPRA environment (chapter 5). 
Failure Injection 
The selected software failures are injected into the software behavior model. Failures 
are injected at the output side of software functions. They can be injected at different 
software levels. 
Considering the software example in Figure 7, it is known that some faults exist in 













Figure 14. Different fault injection methods for an example system LOCAT 
For the same type of failure mode, a high-level software failure is the combined result 
of low-level failures. In the example system, the software failure at the function 





realtimeCalculation and outputResult levels. Software failures belonging to similar 
failure modes should not be modeled at different levels simultaneously.  
The failure-injection level is different from the abstraction level Li. For example, in 
Figure 14, the output failure can be injected at the level of function LOCAT. 
However, the abstraction level of detail may be at the lowest level. In other words, the 
failure can still be injected at the high-level, even if the detailed code is used in the 
behavior model. The level of failure injection cannot go lower than the level of 
abstraction for an obvious reason. The failure cannot be injected at the sub-functions 
getTime and calCoordinate levels if they are not modeled at all. 
The failure-injection location is determined by the analysts. The different injection 
level is dynamically adjusted by the guidance model. 
Failure Probability Quantification 
The selection of software failure modes is based on expert opinion and previous 
experience. Failure probabilities are estimated using statistical data, expert judgment, 
or the test-based methodology mentioned in section 2.1, once the code is available. 
For example, there are two databases for the Space Shuttle Group Project: one for the 
history of the software code and another that records every error ever made on the 
software project.  As a result of the vast amount of data collected in the databases, the 
Space Shuttle Software Group has written software that predicts the amount of errors 
that should be expected. The data in the database is quite detailed: it contains 
information on possible failures in the software code, and the probability of failure. 





also to quantify the failure probabilities [51]. 
Software failures can only be triggered for the specified input domain. To inject a 
failure at the high-level, the analyst needs to define the decomposition of the input 
domain into a minimum input set. The failure probability in each of the sub-domains 
of the minimum input set is a fixed value. The triggering of software failures will be 
based on probabilities. 








Φ=kj II I   for all kj ≠    (4.5) 
For each jlk Ixx ∈,   
The failure probability )()( lk xPxP =  
A Failure Injection Knowledge Base (FIKB) needs to be constructed for the failures 
injected. Each injected failure is related with one software function. The minimum 
input set needs to be defined for those functions. The relationship between failure 
probability and each sub domain inside the minimum input set needs to be defined 







Failure 1 Failure n...
Failure 11 Failure 1n...
... ... ...
 
Figure 15. Structure of the Failure-Injection Knowledge Base 
Each node inside the FIKB can be presented using the following equation. 













=      (4.6) 
I is the software-failure index; the index uniquely defines the injected 
software failures; 
fmi represents the name of the injected software-failure modes (see  
Figure 5); 
fl represents the injected software-failure level in the functional-






Np represents the parent node of the current node; the value is -1 for the Root 
node; 
Ncj represents the child nodes of the current node; the value is -1 if there is no 
child node available; 
n represents the number of child nodes of the current node. 
Ii represents the input domain of the software-failure related function; 
Iji represents each sub-domain of the minimum-input set; the size of the 
minimum-input set is n; 
pfji represents the failure probability for the sub-domain Iji; 
n represents the number of sub-domains. 
Fmi and fl are used in the guidance model to control the activation of the software 
failures at different levels. Once the failures are activated, the relationship between Iji 
and pfji is used to decide whether or not the failures are to be triggered for specific 
input from the simulation environment. 
Considering the example system in Figure 14, the failure can be injected at the level 
of LOCAT as failure failure_LOCAT; it can also be injected at the level of sub-
function realtimeCalculation as failure_realtimeCalculation and sub-function 
outputResult as failure_outputResult. FIKB can be represented using the tree 









Figure 16. AKB for software example in Figure 14 
The guidance model controls the activation of software failures. High-level failures 
and low-level failures can not be actived at the same time. In Figure 16, 
Failure_realtimeCalculation and Failure_outputResult become invisible once 
Failure_LOCAT is actived. Once the failure is activated, the relationship between Iji 
and pfji defined for that failure is used to decide whether or not the failures are to be 







The deterministic model and the stochastic behavior models were introduced in 
previous sections. Several controllable variables are defined inside the behavior 
model. Multi-level abstraction structure is constructed in the deterministic model. The 
simulation level of detail is controlled by the guidance model (section 4.4). Software 
failures are injected through the stochastic model. The failure modes and locations are 
selected by the analysts. Different failure-injection levels are defined in the stochastic 
model. The software failures are triggered in the guidance model. The detailed 
mechanism used is discussed in the following sections. 
To summarize, we can use the following equation to represent every component in 



























I is the software component name or (index), which uniquely defines the 
software components; 
di is a Boolean variable indicating whether one will simulate Si at an abstract 
level ; di is controlled by the scheduler; 
Li is the current level of detail of the function Si in the software 
representation; Li is a relative value. (For a given component, the current level 
of detail may be different, depending on the definition of the baseline in the 





component. The baseline needs to be unified for the whole software 
representation before the simulation); 
Bi is the detail behavior model of the software component Si; 
~
iB  is the abstract behavior model of the software component Si; 
fis is a set of stochastic failures injected at the output side of the normal 
behavior model of the software component Si; 
~
isf  is a set of stochastic failures injected at the output side of the abstract 
behavior model of the software component Si (The structure of 
~
isf  is similar 
as that of fis) ; 
fk is a single software failure injected for this software function; 
fkd is a Boolean variable indicating whether this failure is activated or not (fkd 
is controlled by the simulation guidance model) ; 
m is the total number of software failures injected for this software function; 
⊕  represents that Bi is composed by the sub-function Sij. 
If no abstraction is defined for the software component, equation 4.7 becomes a 
solely functional decomposition of the software component. To explore the system 
vulnerabilities, the software simulation-guidance model controls all the controllable 





4.4 Simulation Guidance Model 
4.4.1 Overview 
The high-level guidance model guides the simulation to explore scenarios of interest, 
in lieu of doing a wide-scale exploration. In this sense the guidance model is not 
necessarily a complete representation of the software system. Instead, it may be 
fragmentary, covering only specific parts of the system. The key elements of the 
software can be identified and built into the guidance model. General knowledge 
about the software and common vulnerabilities should also be defined in the guidance 
model. Meanwhile, a software scheduler needs to be constructed inside the guidance 
model to control the stochastic behavior of the software and to communicate with the 
high-level system scheduler. 
The guidance model simultaneously interacts with the system-behavior model, the 
software-behavior model, and the high-level system scheduler (See Figure 1). The 
high-level scheduler provides high-level simulation requirements. The system-
behavior model provides hardware inputs and human inputs. The software-guidance 
model adjusts the software-behavior model, based on the inputs from the system-
behavior model and the high-level system scheduler. The software-behavior model 
generates the software outputs, based on the inputs from the guidance model. 
4.4.2 Interactions with other models 
Guidance Model vs. System Behavior Model 





relatively clear. The system-behavior model provides the input to the software and 
receives the output from the software. The guidance model works as an intermediate 
layer. Let Is-sw be the input from the system-behavior model to the software-behavior 
model. Let Osw-s be the output from the software-behavior model to the system-
behavior model. 
The input/output for the software-guidance model is: 
Input from the system-behavior model  Is-sw 
Output to the system-behavior model Osw-s 
Table 2. Software-guidance model vs. System-behavior model 
Guidance Model vs. Multi-level Software-Behavior Model 
The software-guidance model provides the software input to the software-behavior 
model and controls the execution of the multi-level software model using control 
variables. The system input to the software Is-sw comes from the system-behavior 
model. The control variables include abstraction level of detail L, which of the pre-
existing software failure types ft should be activated and also the failure simulation 
level of detail fL. The values of L, ft and fL are calculated based on the detailed 
guidance rules. 
The input/output for the software guidance model is:  
Input from the software-behavior model  Osw-s 
Output to the software-behavior model Is-sw L ft fL  





Guidance Models vs. High-Level System Scheduler 
The relationship between the guidance model and the high-level system scheduler is 
the most complex. The high-level system scheduler provides the high-level 
requirements. The guidance model calculates the value of the control variables, based 
on the simulation requirements and the inputs from the system model. It provides the 
system scheduler with the simulation-level control information and the failure-
injection information. Also, the guidance model decides branch generation and 
provides the result back to the high-level system scheduler. Let Rh be the high-level 
requirements from the system scheduler. Let B be the branch-generation information. 
The input/output for the software guidance model is:  
Input from High-Level System Scheduler Rh 
Output to High-Level System Scheduler B L ft fL 
Table 4. Software-guidance model vs. System Scheduler 
Rh includes: 
 Simulation level of detail control factor RL 
 Injected failure type Rft; Injected failure level of detail Rfl 
 Simulation time requirement factors Rt 
There is no direct control from the high-level scheduler for a particular variable, if the 
value of that variable is -1 
The guidance model interacts with the enhanced SimPRA environment to adjust the 
controllable variables. The enhanced high-level planner and scheduler are presented 





4.4.3 Simulation Knowledge Base (SKB) 
A Simulation Knowledge Base (SKB) is constructed inside the software-guidance 
model to store prior knowledge about the software system. SKB, AKB, and FIKB 
together serve as the knowledge base for the software model.  
The following information is stored in the SKB as prior knowledge: 
1. Time-factor related information 
The relationship between the high-level scheduler Simulation time requirement 
factors Rt and the simulation level of detail control factor RL are stored in the 
knowledge base. When there is no direct control from the high-level system 
scheduler, the guidance model decides the simulation level of detail based on the time 
requirements factor from the high-level system scheduler. 
The relationship between Rt and RL is not necessarily a 1-to-1 relationship. When the 
relationship between Rt and RL is 1-to-many, the probability for each pair should also 
be defined in SKB.  
That type of node in SKB can be described using the following equation: 
{ }{ }LnLti RRRtypeiSKB L,,,, 1=          (4.8) 
I is the node index (the index uniquely defines the node in the SKB); 
typei represents the type of node; 
Rt represents the simulation time requirements factor from the high-level 
scheduler; 
RL represents the simulation level of detail; 





The relationship between the pre-defined condition and the simulation level of detail 
is stored in this part. It is an interface that can be modified by the analysts for 
different applications. The pre-defined condition can be configured differently in 
different environments. For instance, in the example system in Figure 17, let us 
assume that the pump-control software is designed to maintain the life-support system 
for the Space Shuttle, based on the temperature, pressure, and time. When the system 
is in a relatively safe range, there is no need to simulate the control software in detail. 
A high-level lookup table is used to simulate the software-deterministic behavior. The 
lookup table is a continuous abstraction for the detailed control equation. When the 
system reaches the danger area, the lookup table is not accurate enough, so the low-

















Figure 17. Pump control system 
The relationship between the simulation level of detail (High/Low) and the 






This type of node in SKB can be described using the following equation: 
{ }{ }LnLi RRCtypeiSKB L,,,, 1=          (4.9) 
I is the node index (the index uniquely defines the node in the SKB); 
typei represents the type of node; 
C represents the pre-defined condition in the system model; 
RL represents the simulation level of detail; 
The above information is simply the type of information we studied to this point. 






Chapter 5: Integrating the Software Representation into 
SimPRA  
5.1 State Explosion Issue 
Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (DPRA) of complex systems is considered to 
be the next generation of PRA techniques. It is not currently in wide use because of 
state explosion issues that need resolution. DPRA is a set of methods and techniques 
in which executable models representing the behavior of the elements of a system are 
exercised in order to identify risks and vulnerabilities of the system, by simulating a 
variety of sequences of events that are representative of the possible true behaviors of 
the system. The event sequences typically share a single initial condition but are 
varied by introducing, at various points in the event sequence, possible deviations due 
to hardware and software failures, as well as human actions. The set of simulated 
sequences is then analyzed to gain insights into courses of events leading to 
undesirable end states, as well as their likelihood.  
State explosion is a well-known problem that impedes the implementation of DPRA 
techniques. The major weakness of the approach based on state space-exploration is 
that the size of the state-space grows exponentially with the number of branches 
generated and thus creates the state space explosion problem. 
Different approaches have been proposed to solve the state explosion issue. One 





end states, thus reducing the branch generations. A second approach is through 
distributed computing which would reduce the loads on a single computer. Another 
approach is to bias the simulation toward interesting events and end states. That 
approach would include the use of a knowledge-driven high-level planner to guide the 
simulation, as well as an entropy-based biasing of the scenarios. The simulation 
scheduler drives the actual-risk scenarios. The SimPRA environment is a real 
implementation of the third approach.  
5.2 SimPRA environment 
5.2.1 Overview 
SimPRA is an adaptive scheduling simulation-based DPRA environment developed 
by the University of Maryland under a grant from NASA Ames Research Laboratory. 
[38] Prior knowledge of the systems and knowledge gained during simulation are 
used to dynamically adjust the exploration rules in the DPRA environment. In 
SimPRA, a high-level simulation scheduler is constructed to control the simulation 
process, generally by controlling the occurrence of the random events inside the 
system model. Instead of using a generic wide-scale exploration, the scheduler is able 
to pick out important scenarios, which are essential to the final system risk, thus 
increasing the simulation efficiency. To do this, a high-level simulation planner was 





5.2.2 Guidance Rule in the single-level SimPRA environment 
The adaptive exploration strategy used in SimPRA is based on an adaptive learning 
procedure. A general framework of adaptive learning procedure is described in Figure 
18. It is believed that there is always information available prior to the experiments. 
The information gained from past data can be used to alter the exploration strategy of 
future exploration to more efficiently address the area of interest. 
 
Figure 18. General framework for adaptive learning 
In the current SimPRA environment, two kinds of knowledge are used to guide the 
simulation. The first category is prior knowledge, including the system-specific 
knowledge, such as the design of a system, plus generally applicable knowledge, such 
as the experience from similar systems. The second category is knowledge obtained 
during simulation, which is used to adaptively guide the simulation towards the 
scenarios of interest and to fairly distribute the simulation among possible scenarios. 







Figure 19. The use of information in the SimPRA environment 
The SimPRA environment includes a planner, a scheduler, and the system simulator 
(see Figure 20).  
The planner serves as a map for exploration. The scenarios of interest are highlighted 
in the planner. The map should not necessarily be accurate and complete; it will be 
updated after each round of simulation. There are two types of updating. The first 
type is automatic updating after simulating a specific number of event sequences. A 
second type of updating needs the analysts’ intervention. The result of simulation 
may disagree with the plan. The discrepancy is highlighted for further investigation 
by the analysts [52].  
The scheduler manages the simulation process, including saving system states, 





simulation toward the plan generated by the planner. The scenarios with high 
importance would be explored with higher priority, while all other scenarios also 
have a chance to be simulated. The objective of the scheduler guidance includes [40]: 
• Maintain sufficient coverage of important scenarios in the plan 
• Guide simulation toward areas of greatest uncertainty  
• Continuously adjust priorities, based on simulation results  
• Avoid test areas known to definitely lead to a specific end state  
• Cover all possible event-sequence space 
 
 
Figure 20.  SimPRA environment 
Whenever it comes to a branching point, the system simulator proposes transitions 
(branches) to the scheduler. The scheduler retrieves the information of the proposed 





back to the simulation, and the simulation model executes the command, continuing 
the simulation until another branching point or end state is reached. 
There are two types of stochastic events in the system model: time-based events and 
demand-based events. One type of stochastic behavior of a component can be 
described by the probability distribution function of time-to-failure. There is another 
class of failure. The probabilistic branching stochastic process has a set of outcomes, 
each with of a probability of occurrence. The timing of the occurrence is not random; 
instead, the outcomes at that point of time are random [38]. In our model, software 
failures are considered to be demand-based failures3 , which means the software 
failure is not triggered unless that part of the software is executed in the simulation 
environment.  
Software aging is another phenomenon discussed in the literature, where the error 
conditions actually accrue with time and/or load, resulting in performance 
degradation and/or failures. The typical causes include memory bloating and leaking, 
unreleased file-locks, data corruption, storage space fragmentation and accumulation 
of round-off errors [53]. This type of failure is not considered in this dissertation.  
5.2.2 Integrating Software into the single-level SimPRA 
Software reliability is defined in [54] by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers as: 
                                                 






“Software reliability is the probability that the software will not cause the failure of 
a product or of a mission for a specified time under specified conditions; this 
probability is a function of the inputs to and use of the product, as well as a function 
of the existence of faults in the software; the inputs to the product will determine 
whether an existing fault is encountered or not.” 
From the definition, it is clear that software reliability is a function of the context in 
which the software operates. Software faults are triggered by specific input conditions. 
Unlike hardware, software does not deteriorate with operation time. However, the 
passing of time is still used as a parameter in some software reliability models due to 
the fact that it usually associates with the count of software execution cycles, which 
has a direct link with the probability of occurrence/non-occurrence of a specific input 
condition.  
Software risk models have been categorized as black-box unconditional software 
reliability formulations and conditional risk formulations in the “Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners” [10]. In the 
conditional risk model, the presence of a software failure event is determined by two 
basic constituents, namely: 
• The “input condition” event that triggers the execution of a certain logic path 
in the software 
• The “software response” to that condition, as determined by the internal logic 
path execution. 





selected functions. The logic path from the beginning of the software input to that 
selected function is already modeled inside the software behavior representation. The 
internal logic of the selected function and the detailed location of the failure are 
unknown to us. The failure probability is related with the input condition. The analyst 
needs to divide the input domain into minimum input sets. Within each minimum 
input set, the failure occurrence probability is treated as a uniform distribution. 
All the failure-related information is stored in FIKB. The detailed structure of FIKB 
is defined in chapter 4. Software failures are treated as demand-based failures. There 
are some differences between software failures and hardware failures.  
The first difference is that demand-based software failures are usually loaded more 
frequently compared with other demand-based components in the simulation 
environment. 
In SimPRA, a branch point is proposed when a component with demand-based failure 
is demanded in the system simulation. For instance, human action can be considered 
as a demand-based component. When a human action is required in the simulation 
environment, the human proposes different actions with different probabilities to the 
scheduler. The scheduler picks one branch based on the scheduling rule. A branch 
point is generated whenever the human action is demanded.  
Software is different due to the reason that software requests are much more intensive 
compared with other components. Considering the space shuttle thrust control 
software, a software output is needed for every single step of the simulation. If there 
is a software failure injected at the output of the thrust control software, it means a 





not efficient and is very time-consuming. The branch point request should be reduced 
to an acceptable level.  
In order to get unbiased estimation of the final system risk, we introduced the concept 
of adjustment factor wa. Adjustment factor wa is a weigh factor ranging from 0 to 1. It 
is used to adjust the number of software branch point requests (See Figure 21) 
 
Figure 21. Software branch point generation adjustment factor 
In Figure 21, only wa percent of software execution proposes a branch point to the 
system scheduler. In order to make the final result unbiased, the adjustment factor 
should be considered when the software proposes a transition to the system scheduler. 
Assume the natural software failure probability is P.  When the software proposes a 
transition to the system scheduler, the probability used should be P/ wa. In this way, 










=×          (5.1) 
Also the occurrence of the branch points remains the same. Assume that the software 
is executed n times. Before applying the adjust factor wa, the probability for the ith 
execution to be selected is: 
Pips =)(          (5.2) 
After applying the adjust factor wa, the probability for the ith event to be selected into 
the group proposing branch generation requests is 
awgip =∈ )(          (5.3) 
Within the group, the probability for each event to be selected is 
a
s w
Pgiip =∈ )|(         (5.4) 






'     (5.5) 
Comparing the equation (5.2) and equation (5.5), one can see that the probability for 
the ith execution to be selected remains the same. Thus the occurrence of the branch 
points remains the same. 
The total branch generation requests decrease after applying the adjust factor wa. 
Before applying wa, the branch generation requests are proposed to the system 
scheduler at every time step when the software is executed. Two branches are 
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a) Before applying the adjust factor
b) After applying the adjust factor  
Figure 22. The effect of the adjust factor to the branch generation 
After applying wa, only wa percent of the software execution proposes the branch 
generation requests to the system scheduler. Two branches are generated for each 
request. For the rest of the software execution, no branch generation requests are 
proposed to the system scheduler. Thus only one branch is generated. (See Figure 22 
b) 
Assume that the actual software execution can be represented using a Poisson 
distribution with parameter λ. The number of branches generated after time T is: 
Before applying wa   2×Tλ  
After applying wa  )1())1(2( aaa wTwwT +×=−+×× λλ  
The adjustment factor can be selected by the analyst. But the value of the adjustment 
factor should be greater than the natural probability of the software failure P.  
Pwa >≥1          (5.6) 

















=      (5.7) 
We can define: 
)1),)max(*min(( ,,1 njja pfmw L==           1>m     (5.8) 
Considering a software function with the following input domain: 
{ })05.0,(),001.0,(),02.0,(),01.0,(, 4321 IIIII  
We can get: 
)1,05.0*min()1),05.0,001.0,02.0,01.0max(*min()1),)max(*min(( ,,1 mmpfmw njja === = L
The factor m is defined by the analyst for different software failures. The increase of 
the value of m increases the total number of branch points. A small value of m 
decreases the stochastic characteristic of the software failures. Figure 23 shows the 
relationship between wa and the total number of branch point requests in the space 






Figure 23. wa vs. the total number of branch point requests in the space shuttle example 
Comparing Figure 21 with the software failure template of Figure 11 and Figure 12, 
the transitions within the template should be clear at this point. 
The second difference is that the software failure probability is not a fixed value as in 
other demand-based components. The failure probability is input condition dependent. 
In FIKB, different failure probabilities are defined for different minimum input sets. 
When the software-behavior model proposes a branch point to the scheduler, the 
request is sent to the software-guidance model to get the failure probability based on 
the input value. The guidance model queries FIKB to get the actual failure 
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Figure 24. Software failure branch point generation procedure 
The detailed rules used in the system scheduler to select a branch based on its value 





5.3 Enhanced SimPRA environment 
5.3.1 Overview 
The state explosion issue was discussed in section 5.1. Three different approaches to 
solve the problem were introduced. In this section, an alternative approach is 
presented, in which a multi-level simulation environment is constructed; multi-level 
objects are defined within the simulation environment; multi-layer planner and 
scheduler are constructed and dynamically used to guide the risk simulation at the 
right level of detail and abstraction. That reduces the branch generation and mitigates 
the state explosion problem.  
The initial levels of the multi-level objects are defined by the analysts in the plan. The 
simulation results are used to adjust the level of detail to an appropriate level. The 
multi-level objects are simulated at a relatively high-level when they are not 
important for the end states of interest (see Figure 25). 
 
Figure 25. Sample scenarios consisting of multi-level objects 





provided to use software models at different levels of detail and fidelity. The 
innovative aspect of the approach is that the selection of the most appropriate level of 
detail is initially specified by the analyst in the Planner, but then automatically 
adjusted during the various rounds of simulation according to an entropy-based rule. 
5.3.2 Enhanced Planner 
As we discussed before, the planner is designed to guide the simulation towards a 
smarter and faster way to assess the risks of the system and generate useful 
knowledge about the contribution of different classes of scenarios. The goal of the 
plan is to guide the system to fail in such a way that the user’s knowledge about the 
system is increased. The planning process that is suggested is dynamic, meaning that 
the plan is updated by the results of the simulation. Figure 26 shows the cycle that the 






Figure 26. Planner update cycle 
A high-level Scripting Language (SL), similar to a programming language, is defined 
in [38, 55] to represent the types of knowledge including physical and mathematical 
knowledge as well as temporal knowledge.  
In the enhanced SimPRA environment, a special Level Control Node (LCN) is added 
to SL to represent the level information for multi-level objects. The LCN is added to 
the scenarios generated in the plan. The structure of the LCN can be represented as: 
},,{ valuetypeLCN  
The type of level control nodes includes: 
1. Undefined: the level control information is undefined. 
2. Direct level control: the direct value for the level of simulation 
3. Time Factor: the time factor required at this point (see section 4.4.3) 
LCN is used to control the simulation level of detail for the multi-level objects. For 
the direct level control, a System Level Knowledge Base (SLKB) is constructed 
separately to associate the value of the level control with the level of detail for the 
software, human and hardware. (See Table 5 for an example) 
LCN Control Value Hardware level  Software Level Human Level 
1 1 1 1 
2 1 2 2 
3 1 3 2 
Table 5. An example for the system level knowledge base 
Inside the knowledge base, each row represents a compatible combination of the level 





connected components needs to be compatible. For instance, if the software output is 
connected to the human input, the number of output from the software model needs to 
be compatible with the human input requirements. In other words, the human model 
needs to be able to understand the software input and process the software input at the 
level used. 
The planner is loaded into the scheduler at the beginning of the simulation. The 
simulation level of detail is adjusted adaptively based on the information in the plan, 
the information in the guidance model of different components, and the previous 
simulation results. After each round of simulation, the planner is updated, based on 
the prior simulation results. The detailed adaptive scheduling rule and the updating 
mechanism will be discussed in the following sections. 
At the beginning of each simulation, the scheduler loads the plan from the plan file 
generated by the planner. An ESD is constructed based on the scenarios within the 
plan. LCN at the beginning of the scenario indicates that this plan is a multi-level 






















Figure 27. Example ESD constucted from a pre-defined plan 
5.3.3 Enhanced Scheduler 
The enhanced scheduler is established to handle multi-level objects in the simulation 
model. The scheduler loads the plan at the beginning of the simulation. If the ESD 
from the plan starts with LCN, the scheduler initializes the multi-level objects based 
on the information in the first LCN.  
The scheduler controls the level of multi-level objects based on the following logic.  
1. If LCN contains the direct control information, scheduler reads the level 
information from LCN; queries the system level knowledge base to get the 
detailed simulation level for each sub-component; sets the simulation level of 
detail for all multi-level objects. If there is no direct control information, go to 
step 2; 
2. If LCN contains time factor requirements4, the scheduler sends the time factor 
requirements to the sub-components guidance model. In our case, the system 
                                                 
4 The time factor for different LCN is defined separately based on the input from the analyst. The value of time 





scheduler sends an information request to the software guidance model, the 
guidance model queries SKB to get the level control information based on the 
time factor requirement and sends it back to the high-level scheduler; the high 
level scheduler queries SLKB to check the compatibility of the level 
information received from each sub-component and obtain a valid 
combination; the scheduler sets the simulation level of detail for all multi-
level objects based on the combination. 
3. If LCN is undefined, the scheduler sends this information to the sub-
component guidance models. The guidance model decides the simulation level 
based on the information in SKB and sends it back to the high-level scheduler; 
the high level scheduler queries SLKB to check the compatibility of the level 
information received from each sub-component and obtain a valid 
combination; the scheduler sets the simulation level of detail for all multi-
level objects based on the combination. 
As discussed before, the plan is updated during simulation. In SimPRA, user could 
specify the number of event sequences of one updating interval, and number of 
updating round.  
After the simulation has started, the enhanced scheduler will control the simulation 
level of detail during each simulation. The simulation continues until it reaches a 
LCN node. The level control logic is the same for all LCNs within the plan. The 
simulation level of detail for multi-level objects only changes when the simulation 























Figure 28. Simulation level of detail adjustment logic 
The plan is updated after one round of simulation. The information in LCN is updated 
based on the simulation results. A post simulation analysis is executed after each 
round of simulation. The switching mechanism is based on Shannon’s entropy 
measure [56-58] and its application to simulation branch generation introduced in 
[38]. In this research the entropy-based branch control is extended to simulation level 
control.  
For a event sequence with two end states, let x be our degree of belief that end state E 
will be reached, and let our belief regarding this probability be described by a Beta 
distribution 








=                                                                                (5.9) 
where 1α −  and 1β −  respectively represent the number of times that end states 1 
and 2 are observed in a total of 2α β+ −  sequences. Then the entropy measure is 
equal to 
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For large values of z, the digamma function can be approximated efficiently by 
( ) ( ) 2ln zzz −≈ψ          (5.14) 
After N simulation, the entropy reaches its maximum value when 1α −  = N or 
1β − =N. The entropy reaches its minimum value when 1α −  = 1β −  = N/2. A small 
value of entropy indicates a state of ignorance about the outcome of the scenario. A 
large value of entropy indicates a good confidence about the outcome of the scenario.  
The entropy value is calculated for each multi-level object in the plan. It is used 
together with the conditional end state probability after this node. The conditional 
probability for end state of interest is calculated. It is a value ranging from 0 to 1. A 
large value indicates that the execution of the failure in this multi-level object has a 
large probability to lead the simulation to the end state of interest.  








Figure 29. Part of an example plan 
Software failures are executed after LCN1, the result of simulation indicates the 
entropy for the software failure is high and the conditional probability to the end state 
of interest is high, which indicates that we have a high confidence that the execution 
of the software failure greatly influences the simulation to the end state of interest. In 
this case, the software model should be further decomposed to get more accurate 
results. In the reverse case, it indicates that the execution of the software failure does 
not have a great influence to lead the simulation to the end state of interest. In this 
case, the software model should stay at a relatively high-level.  
The threshold for entropy and the conditional probability is defined by the analyst 
before simulation begins. It can be further updated after each round of simulation. 
After each round of simulation, the entropy value and the conditional probability for 
each multi-level object is calculated and compared with the level information in the 
previous LCN. If the value of entropy indicates that the simulation level should be 
adjusted, the scheduler submits a request to the multi-level objects guidance models. 
In our case, the system scheduler submits a request to the software guidance model to 
check if any updates are available. If no further updates are available for the software, 
the plan is treated as the best plan available. The simulation results are calculated 
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The use of entropy-based strategies in the dynamic PRA environment to select 
different branches is discussed in [39].  
5.3.4 Software Guidance Model in SimPRA 
The software guidance model receives the update request from the system scheduler. 
The basic updating algorithm is presented in Figure 31. 
Start Simulation






Level can go futher?Adjust simulation level










Figure 31: Software Guidance update mechanism 
5.4 Integration 





environment is as follows: 
1 Identify the boundary of the software. Decompose the software into independent 
software blocks. Each block is modeled separately. 
2 Define the information available and construct the executable behavior model 
using SFSM. (section 4.3.2) 
3 Define the multi-level structure for the selected functions. In this step, the analyst 
needs to choose the functions first. Then define the abstraction method and build 
the high-level abstraction model for the selected functions. (section 4.3.3) 
4 Select the software failures based on the available information, including the 
failure type and different failure levels. Inject the software failures into the 
behavior model. (section 4.3.4) 
5 Construct AKB and FIKB using the software modeling tool. (section 4.3.3 and 
section 4.3.4) 
6 Build the software guidance model; establish the interface between the guidance 
model and other models. (section 4.4) 
7 Establish SKB. The analyst needs to categorize the prior knowledge available, 
define the interface and summarize it in SKB. (section 4.4.3) 
8 Integrate the software components in the high-level planner. The multi-level 
abstraction information should be included in the plan generated. (section 5.3) 






Chapter 6:  Experimental Demonstration --- Propulsion System 
Mission and Design Problem 
6.1 Introduction 
The benchmark problem is a multi-phase mission involving an ion propulsion system 
needed for a science mission to the outer solar system. The propulsion system is 
needed only in some of the phases, during which thrust is continually provided. 
Mission Profile 
An ion propulsion system is needed for a science mission to the outer solar system. 
Figure 32 depicts the mission phases, along with the propulsion system operating 
time during each phase in hours of Mission Elapsed Time (MET). Table 6 conveys 
the same information in tabular form. For those phases where the propulsion system 
only operates during part of the phase (e.g. Phases 4 & 5), thrust is continually 
provided from the beginning of the phase until the specified operating time expires. 












Figure 32. Propulsion System Mission Profile 
Mission Phase No. Duration (Hours) Propulsion System Operating 
Time (Hours) 
1 5520.0 5520.0 
2 336.0 0 
3 9043.2 9043.2 
4 26280.0 13140.0 
5 26858.5 25001.0 
6 500.0 0 
7 9501.5 9501.5 
Table 6.  Mission Profile (table used in previous version) 
Design Description 
The propulsion system consists of 5 thruster assemblies and a single propellant 
supply. Each assembly has: 
1) propulsion power unit (PPU), and 
2) ion engines 
When an assembly is operating, the PPU provides power to just one ion engine. The 
other engine will be in a standby mode, unless failed. 
During Phase 1 the success criterion is propulsion from 2 assemblies. In all 
subsequent phases where the propulsion system is operating, the success criterion is 
propulsion from 3 assemblies. 
Relative to the assembly operation, the strategy is to use Assemblies 1 through 2 
during the first phase. During subsequent phases, Assemblies 1 through 3 will furnish 
propulsion, if available. 
Failure of an assembly causes it to be replaced by the lowest numbered standby 





Assembly 3.  If no further failures occur during Phase 1, assemblies 2, 3 & 4  will 
furnish propulsion at the beginning of Phase 3. 
Basically, standby assemblies remain in standby until they are needed to replace a 
failed assembly, and they are actuated in series (i.e., the lowest numbered assembly is 
first selected). 
Figure 33 is a schematic of a thruster assembly.  In assessing the mission risk input 
power failures are modeled separately, so the propulsion system model can ignore a 
loss of power from that support system. 
The strategy for thruster assembly operation is to begin with power from the PPU 
going to Ion Engine A.  Ion Engine A will continue to be the operating engine of the 
assembly until the engine fails.  At that time the strategy is to: 
• shutdown the PPU; 
• switch the PPU to Ion Engine B; then 
• reenergize the PPU and operate with Ion Engine B. 
There are no intermediate switches between a PPU and the ion engines.  All switches 
are integral to the PPU. 
Figure 33 also depicts a propellant supply to each engine.  The propellant is a noble 
gas from a common storage tank.  The engine ionizes and accelerates the propellant 
to produce thrust.  Since the propellant supply is part of the propulsion system, it 






Figure 33.  Thruster Assembly Schematic 
Common cause failures (CCF) should be assessed using the conditional probability 
values from Table 7 by the CCF model of choice. No specific CCF model is 
endorsed, but any simplification or approximation of CCF probabilities must be based 
on calculations using the values below. 





Table 7.  Common Cause Failure Modeling Values 
Table 8 is a failure mode and effects analysis for the propulsion system.  Reliability 
data are listed in Table 9. 
Component Failure Mode Effect 





Propellant (to A) 





Component Failure Mode Effect 
 Failure to operate  
 Failure to shutdown on 
demand5 
 
Ion Engine A Fails to start on demand6 Loss of redundancy 
 Failure to operate  
Ion Engine B Fails to start on demand Assembly failure 
 Failure to operate  
Propellant Valve A Failure to open on demand Loss of Ion Engine A 
 Failure to close on demand System failure 
 External leakage  
Propellant Valve B Failure to open on 
demand7 
Loss of Ion Engine B 
 Failure to close on demand System failure 
 External leakage  
Propellant tank External leakage System failure 
Propellant distribution 
lines 
External leakage System failure 
Table 8.  Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
Component Type Failure Mode Value 
PPU Fails to start on demand 1×10-4 (per demand) 
 Failure to operate 1×10-6 (per hour) 
 Failure to shutdown on 
demand 
1×10-5 (per demand) 
 Fails to switch to Ion 
Engine B 
2×10-6 (per demand) 
Ion Engine Fails to start on demand 3×10-5 (per demand) 
 Failure to operate 2×10-5 (per hour) 
                                                 
5  Failure of a PPU to shutdown on demand will burn it out rather quickly.  This results in an assembly 
failure because the PPU is permanently disabled. 
6  An ion engine is shutdown on demand be shutting down its PPU and closing its propellant valve.  Hence, 
failure to shutdown on demand is not an ion engine failure mode.  However, the power surge 
experienced when an ion engine is started (i.e., when its PPU initially supplies power) subjects an ion 
engine to appreciable internal stresses that can result in failure to start on demand. 
7  If Ion Engine A fails in an assembly, the strategy for transferring to Ion Engine B includes terminating 





Component Type Failure Mode Value 
 Failure to shutdown on 
demand 
3×10-6 (per demand) 
Propellant Valve Failure to open on demand 3×10-4 (per demand) 
 Failure to close on demand 3×10-4 (per demand) 
 External leakage 5×10-5 (per hour) 
Propellant tank External leakage 1×10-6 (per hour) 
Propellant distribution 
lines 
External leakage 1×10-6 (per hour) 
Table 9.  Reliability Data 
Predicated upon the above mission and design descriptions, the time-dependent 
reliability of the propulsion system over the planned mission should be quantified. 
6.2 Simulation Model 
6.2.1 Overview 
The benchmark system is a system with hardware components and software 
components. The whole software system is a parallel running software system with 6 
sub software-components: 1 central control unit and 5 thruster assembly control 
software. The central control software controls the status of the 5 assemblies by 
sending control signals. The thruster assembly control software receives the 
command from the central control software; controls the working status of the 
assembly; and sends the status of the assembly back to the central control unit.  
6.2.1 Software Model 






Figure 34. High level software overview for PSAM benchmark problem 
The central control software controls the status of the assemblies during different 
phases of the mission (See Figure 35). During each phase, the central control software 
monitors the status of each assembly. If any working assembly fails, the control unit 
powers off the failure unit and turns on the backup assembly (Figure 36). If there is 
no backup assembly available, software control unit sends a signal to the simulation 






Figure 35. Central control software representation for PSAM benchmark problem 
 





There are 4 different states for each assembly during the mission: Standby, working, 
switching and failure. A state diagram for the assembly is represented in Figure 37. 
 
Figure 37. State Diagram for assembly control software 
6.3 Discussion 
In this chapter, a detailed software representation is presented to represent the parallel 
control software based on the mission profile. No software failure is represented in 
the original mission profile. But the simulation model can be easily extended to 
introduce software malfunction failure modes. The impact of the software failures to 
the system risk can be fully studied based on the simulation results, i.e., risk scenarios 
leading to predefined End States are in form of specific realizations of time dependent 





realizations [59].   
In the next chapter, a software model is constructed for a complex system. Different 
types of software failure are injected in the software model. Three levels of 







Chapter 7:  Experimental Demonstration --- PACS 
7.1 PACS System Introduction 
The PACS system is a simplified version of an automated personnel-entry-access 
system (gate) used to limit physical access to rooms, buildings, or other facilities to 
authorized persons, to whom coded identification (ID) cards have been issued. The ID 
card contains the person’s name and social security number.  Users insert their ID 
cards into a reader. The system searches for a match in the system’s updateable 
database, requests the user’s four-digit Personal Identification Number (PIN), 
validates the PIN, and unlocks a turnstile gate for entry. A single-line display screen 
and a 12-key keyboard provide communication between the system and its users. A 
security officer monitors a duplicate message on his/her console with override 
capability. 
The software system initially displays the message “INSERT CARD,” then checks a 
register for a 0 or 1 value to determine if the card has been inserted into the card 
reader. Given a positive response (value 1), it reads the nine-digit social security 
number and the twenty-character last name and validates that data against the 
information in the card database. If the card is valid, the software displays the 
message “ENTER PIN”. Should the card not be readable then the message “RETRY” 
is posted for a maximum of three tries, after which the system posts the message “See 





The PACS system involves two humans (the user and the guard) and six hardware 
components (the card reader, keyboard, single-line digital message display unit, the 
guard’s display unit, guard reset unit, and a gate).  
In the event of fire, the user needs to pass through the gate within sixty seconds. The 
guard may notice the fire right away and open the gate directly. If the guard does not 
open the gate, the user needs to pass through the gate using his ID card and PIN. The 
user’s stress increases as the remaining time decreases. The guard may leave his 
position in case of fire. Even when the actions of the user are correct, hardware 
failures may generate incorrect inputs to the software. Software implementation or 
requirements failures may be another reason for a delay in the opening of the gate. 
The complex interaction among software, hardware, human and environment finally 
leads to two end states. The end result may be either loss of occupant or successful 
escape. 
7.2 Simulation Model 
7.2.1 Overview 
Let us model the example system at the requirements stage. The software, human, 
hardware and environment factors are modeled separately. Figure 38 shows a high-











There follows the description of each block: 
• FireEnvironment: This block simulates the fire initiator. The environment 
factor evolves as the fire unfolds and so does the Human Performance 
Influence Factor Stress. From Figure 38, we can see that the output of this 
block serves as an input to the human modeling blocks. 
• UserInput, GuardInput: These two blocks are human modeling blocks. The 
human receives input from the software and control command information 
from the high-level system scheduler. The human then performs different 
actions, based on the inputs. For instance, the user may insert card, input PIN, 
etc. Human stress increases as the time remaining decreases, causing the user 
and the guard to be more prone to errors. The guard will leave his position 
when the time remaining is less than 10 seconds. 
• Hardware block: The hardware components are simulated in this modeling 
block. The hardware serves as a bridge between humans and software. If a 
hardware failure occurs, the corresponding software input may be incorrect 
even if the human’s input is correct. The gate may not open even if the 
software generates the right open gate command when a failure of the turnstile 
gate hardware occurs. 
• Software block: The software representation. Detailed procedures for building 
the model are discussed in the following sections. 
The hardware and human modeling blocks are not the focus of this research; 





7.2.2 Software Model 
Below are the detailed steps for building the software representation. 
Step 1: Identify the boundary of the software. PACS is an independent software 
system; therefore, PACS is modeled as a whole unit. 
Step 2: Model the PACS behavior, based on the software requirements specification. 
The PACS model is implemented using Matlab/Simulink. Figure 39 shows a high-
level view of the PACS software model: 
 
Figure 39. Detailed PACS behavior model 
Step 3: Define the multi-level structure for PACS. Three levels are defined. 
The highest level is to treat PACS as a single block (Abstract PACS in Figure 40). 
User card information, User PIN input, and guard inputs are treated as one single 
input. The output is gate status (open or not). The time necessary for human input and 






Figure 40. Level 1 abstraction for PACS 
The second level goes inside PACS. PACS is decomposed into Insert_Card, 
Read_Card, Read_PIN, Verfiy_PIN. The structure of Detailed_PACS is similar to 
that in Figure 39. All sub-functions are at the lowest level, except Read_PIN. An 
abstraction of Read_PIN is used at this level. The input to this sub-function is the 
correctness of the PIN value (true or false). No detailed PIN input is simulated at this 
level. The output of Read_PIN is the PIN status. The human input time and the 
software execution time are added as the Read_PIN execution delay.  
The third level corresponds to a detailed view of Read_PIN. The PIN input is 
processed digit by digit. Figure 41 is a detailed simulation model for function 






Figure 41. Detailed simulation model for Read_PIN 
Step 4: From past experience, typical software failures are selected for different 
abstraction levels. Below are some of the failures injected: 
Level Function Failure Modes Failure Description 
1 PACS Value A value failure is injected at the output of 
PACS; gate does not open even if the user 
inserts the correct card and inputs the 
correct PIN.  
1 PACS Time A delay failure is injected at the output of 
PACS; gate opening is delayed even if the 
user inserts the correct card and inputs the 
correct PIN. 
2 Read_PIN Time An infinite time delay is injected for any 
abnormal PIN input.  
3 Done_Input Function 8 If the input is not “enter” as expected, 
Function Done_Input leads the software 
to a crash state.  
Table 10. Software failure examples for PACS  
Step 5: The Software AKB and FIKB are constructed automatically, based on the 
PACS software model. PACS is a small example with only a three-layer abstraction; 
                                                 





so, the structure of the knowledge base is relatively simple. Figure 42 is the structure 
for the abstraction knowledge. Because of the nature of the abstraction knowledge 





Figure 42. Abstraction knowledge base for PACS 
Step 6: Build the software guidance model; establish the interface between the 
guidance model and other models. The software model is integrated in the whole 
system model (see Figure 38). The input/output interfaces are defined and connected 
to the rest of the system model. 
Step 7: Establish SKB. The analyst needs to categorize the prior knowledge available, 
define the interface and summarize it in SKB.  
Two types of information are categorized and stored in SKB. The first type is the 
time-related information. A simple knowledge base is constructed to build the 
relationship between the high-level system scheduler time requirements and 
controllable variables. In the PACS example, the time requirements factor from the 
high-level scheduler includes three different values.  








Table 11. Time requirement factor table for PACS 
The second category is the prior knowledge information. Based on prior knowledge, 
the user has a very low probability to exit the gate if the time remaining is less than 
10 seconds since the guard is no longer available and the user will easily make a 
mistake in such a short time. PACS is simulated at the highest level if the pre-defined 
condition is true. 
Tremaining < 10s, RL = 1        
Step 8: Integrate the software components in the high-level planner. Software input 
and output vary, depending on the software level. The human input should also be 
defined separately for different levels. The multi-level abstraction information is 
included in the plan generated. The following scenario is part of the plan generated.  
In the event of a gate failure, the probability that the gate will open is low even if the 
software issues the gate open command. In this scenario, PACS is executed at the 
highest level. In the case of a keyboard failure, PACS is executed at the second level 
since there is a high probability that the software will receive a wrong PIN even if the 



















Figure 43. Extract of the plan for the PACS simulation 
In the high-level system scheduler, a knowledge base is constructed to store the 
relationship between the software simulation level of detail and the human simulation 
level of detail. The human simulation level of detail is adjusted automatically with the 
software simulation level of detail by the high-level system scheduler. 
Step 9: Run the simulation and update the plan using the simulation results. The 
initial plan for the multi-level objects may not be perfect. The plan is updated 
automatically based on the simulation results. 
Running the simulation model based on the pre-defined plan, the cumulative 






Figure 44. Probability estimation from SimPRA 









































7.3 Traditional vs. Dynamic  
PACS has been studied in [3] using the traditional PRA methodology. The ESD in 
Figure 46 is used to model the system evolution. Software components are included 
in the ESD and quantified using the test-based methodology. 
The ESD in Figure 46 is a simplified version with conservative assumptions. The 
guard intervention is restricted to the beginning of the fire. If the guard fails to take 
action, the user will only have one chance to escape the gate using his card or PIN. 
Failure to insert the right card or to input the right PIN all lead to loss of occupants. 
The assumption here is that the guard always opens the gate directly in case of fire if 
the guard is in his position. If the guard is not in his position, no one is going to open 
the gate or reset the system thus the user only has one chance to insert the right card 
and input the right PIN. The logic here seems clear and complete under this 
assumption. But it is not. For instance, the dynamic scenario in Figure 45 is not 
covered in this ESD. The following story can be retrieved from Figure 45: 
The guard noticed the fire immediately and decided to open the gate directly. He 
pressed the gate open button but the gate did not open due to a hardware failure in 
the guard reset unit. The user tried to exit the gate using his card and PIN. The guard 
stayed in his position to reset the system if needed. Even if the guard can not open the 
gate directly, he can still reset the system and allow the user multiple trials. The user 
inserted the right card but input the wrong PIN due to stress. The guard reset the 












































































































Apparently this scenario fits into the assumptions used to create Figure 46 but is not 
covered in the ESD. The reason is complex. The dynamic interactions among the 
components make it difficult for the analyst to identify and predict all the possible 
scenarios. Meanwhile the count of scenarios increases dramatically if the analyst 
needs to consider the details of the system. The analyst has to model at a relatively 
high-level to explore all possible scenarios. In the ESD in Figure 46, the software 
related blocks B1, B2, B3 in the ESD represent a group of events. For instance, block 
B1 in Figure 46 represents the Read Card function. Two different branches originate 
from block B1: correct card is read or failure to read card. Considering the second 
branch, the possible reason for failing to read the card includes a failure of the 
software function Read_Card, a failure of the card reader hardware, and human 
failure. If the analyst needs to unfold all these blocks, the size of the ESD will 
increase dramatically. Using the dynamic PRA methodology, the analyst only needs 
to construct the behavior model and the simulation environment explores all the 
scenarios automatically. The level of detail can be easily changed. Meanwhile, once 
the system model has been constructed, only small modifications are needed to obtain 
results under different assumptions.  
Compared with the traditional PRA methodology, software modeling in the DPRA 
environment has the following benefits: 
• The dynamic methodology generates more information in the output. 
The scenarios generated in the dynamic environment include time-related 





related information is generated in the ESD.  
• The system model generated using the dynamic methodology can be easily 
and economically maintained and modified. 
If a new failure needs to be included in the system analysis, the entire ESD in the 
traditional methodology may need to be reconstructed and all components may need 
to be re-quantified if the operational profile is different. In the dynamic environment, 
the result can be obtained easily by running the simulation after adding the new 
failure in the system model. 
• The system and software models generated using the dynamic methodology 
are reusable. 
The system and software model generated in the dynamic environment can be easily 
reused for a different system if similar components exist.  
7.4 Multi-level Simulation 
The system model for PACS is a multi-level model, as described in section 7.2. 
Running the simulation at different levels generates different results. PACS has been 
executed under the following three different cases: 
Case 1: The execution of PACS has been maintained at the highest level: level 1; 
Case 2: The execution of PACS has been maintained at the lowest level: level 3; 
Case 3: The simulation level of detail is dynamically adjusted by the simulation 
environment.  





 Time Used (s) Success  Loss of Occupant 
Case 1 412.26 0.891 0.109 
Case 2 463.61 0.947 0.053 
Case 3 447.28 0.928 0.072 
Table 12. Multi-level simulation: Run-time for different levels of detail (within SimPRA) 
In Table 12, the “time used” factor is influenced by both the software model and other 
parts of the simulation environment. Table 13 displays the run time obtained when the 
contribution of the software model is isolated from the simulation environment. 
 Time Used (s) 
Case 1 187.985 
Case 2  219.063 
Case 3 213.469 
Table 13. Multi-level simulation: Run-time for different levels of detail (in Isolation) 
7.5 Comparison of software model vs. Real code 
In this section an experiment is designed to validate the software model when 
compared with the real code. All hardware failures are removed from the PACS 
system model. The guard action is restricted to responding to the user’s requests. In 
other words, the guard will not open the gate before the user inserts his card, or inputs 
his PIN. Also the guard will not leave when the time left is small. The software 
models are built based on different levels of knowledge from analysts. The profile for 
PACS is completely defined. Value-related failures are injected into PACS and 
testing is performed on the real code. Analysts design the software model based on 
the results from different levels of test results. The models are integrated into the 





using the code directly in the simulation environment. 
Here are the basic procedures for this experiment: 
1. Define a complete operation profile for PACS 
2. Inject software failures into PACS code 
3. Test PACS; different levels of results are obtained based on the number of 
rounds of tests performed 
4. Build a software model based on different levels of knowledge; integrate the 
software model into the simulation environment and run the simulation 
5. Integrating the software code into the simulation environment; the IO part of 
the software model is modified to fit the simulation environment; compare the 
simulation results with the results from step 5. 
6. Calculate quantitative coverage information through the comparison of  
scenarios generated 
Step 1: Define a complete operation profile for PACS 
All hardware failures are removed from the current PACS system model. In that way, 
the influence of hardware failure is isolated from the final system risk estimation. 
Final results are influenced only by the software model and the human decisions. The 
following profile is used for the human:  
• The probability for a user to insert a right/wrong card is 0.55/0.45 
• The probability for a user to insert a right/wrong PIN is 0.55/0.45 






Assume PACS is used in a building with 10 employees with SSNs and PINs as 
follows: 
Name SSN PIN 
Jacob 212590000 0000 
Michael 212590001 1111 
Joshua 212590002 2222 
Matthew 212590003 3333 
Andrew 212590004 4444 
Christopher 212590005 5555 
Joseph 212590006 6666 
Nicholas 212590007 7777 
Daniel 212590008 8888 
William 212590009 9999 
Table 14. User records 
The following assumptions apply: 
• Only the first 5 people have the authorization to pass through the gate.  
• All four numbers in a PIN are the same. There are only 10 different PINs 
available during simulation. 
• All cards used during simulation belong to the 10 records in Table 14. 
For each user, the probability of inserting the right/wrong card is 0.55/0.45. The first 
5 cards in Table 14 are treated as right cards; the rest, as wrong cards. The 
right/wrong cards are uniformly distributed in the set of right/wrong cards. Once the 
user inserts the card, the probability of inputting a right PIN is 0.55. The probability 
of a user inputting a wrong PIN is 0.45. The wrong PINs are uniformly distributed in 
the set of wrong PINs.  
Step 2: Inject software failures into PACS 





database is erroneous, and the following information is the information actually 
stored in the database. 
SSN Name PIN 
212590000 Jacob 0000 
212590001 Michael 5555 
212590002 Joshua 2222 
212590003 Matthew 3333 
212590004 Andrew 4444 
212590005 Christopher 5555 
212590006 Joseph 6666 
212590001 Michael 1111 
Table 15. Database used in PACS 
The following errors are observed in the database: 
1. There are two records for Michael in Table 15; the first record contains the 
wrong PIN 
2. Christopher and Joseph are not supposed to be in the database 
Because of those errors, the following different value-related failure modes exist in 
PACS: 
1. A user with a correct card and correct PIN cannot enter the gate 
2. A user with an unauthorized card and right PIN can enter the gate 
3. A user with a correct card and wrong PIN can enter the gate  
Those failures are typical in this type of system. The failure probability for each 
failure mode can be obtained through software testing.  
Step 3: Test PACS.  
A test environment is designed using visual C++. The software input is sampled from 





failures residing in the software; using the original design information, tests are 
performed at different software levels. 
[High-level Testing] 
The first testing is performed on the entire software. The following results are 
obtained after the indicated number of tests: 
Number of Tests 10 100 1000 10000 
Right Card, Right PIN, Success 6 58 542 5385 
Right Card, Right PIN, Fail 0 7 74 741 
Right Card, Wrong PIN, Success 0 1 18 186 
Right Card, Wrong PIN, Fail 1 8 100 1060 
Wrong Card, Right PIN, Success 3 19 222 2196 
Wrong Card, Right PIN, Fail 0 0 0 0 
Wrong Card, Wrong PIN, Success 0 0 0 0 
Wrong Card, Wrong PIN, Fail 0 5 26 209 
Wrong Card, Fail 0 2 18 225 
Table 16. Test results for PACS 
Based on the test results, the failure probabilities can be calculated for different 
inputs: 
Conditional Probability Input Failure 
10 100 1000 10000 
Right Card, Right PIN Fails to go through 0 0.108 0.120 0.121 
Right Card, Wrong PIN Goes through 0 0.111 0.153 0.149 
Wrong Card, Right PIN Goes through 1 1 1 1 
Wrong Card, Wrong PIN Goes through N/A 0 0 0 
Table 17. Failure probabilities for PACS (from high-level test results from Table 16) 
From the results in Table 17, we observe that more software failures are detected after 
enough rounds of testing are performed. In this example, all software failures can be 
detected after a certain rounds of testing.  





errors. Theoretically, a user with a wrong card shall not be able to go through the 
gate, and a user with a right card and the right PIN can always go through. The high-
level human input profile can be calculated, based on the theoretical probabilities; but 
this method is inaccurate because of software failures. In this example, multiple 
software failures are observed after software testing. So the high-level operational 
profile should also be updated based on test results. The operational profile for the 
human can be calculated based on the test results in Table 16. 
Conditional Probability Input 
10 100 1000 10000 
Right Card, Right PIN 0.6 0.65 0.616 0.6126 
Right Card, Wrong PIN 0.1 0.09 0.118 0.1246 
Wrong Card, Right PIN 0.3 0.19 0.222 0.2196 
Wrong Card, Wrong PIN 0 0.05 0.026 0.0209 
Wrong Card, No PIN Input 0 0.02 0.018 0.0225 
Table 18. Operational Profile for High-level PACS 
[Low-level Testing] 
The second test is performed at a detailed level. The testing is performed for sub-
functions: Card validation and PIN validation. The following table shows the test 
results for card validation: 
Total Tests 10 100 1000 10000 
Right Card, PIN Entry Process can proceed 7 56 544 5500 
Right Card, Fail 0 0 0 0 
Wrong Card, PIN Entry Process can proceed 1 20 192 1825 
Wrong Card, Fail 2 24 264 2675 
Table 19. Testing results for card validation 






Conditional Probability Input Failure 
10 100 1000 10000 
Right Card Fails to go through 0 0 0 0 
Wrong Card Goes through 0.333 0.455 0.421 0.406 
Table 20. Failure probability for card validation 
A further test is performed for PIN validation. It is performed separately and 
conditioned on the types of card validation. Table 21 lists the PIN validation test 
results when the user has used a right card to pass the card validation stage. Table 22 
lists the PIN validation test results when the user has used a wrong card to pass the 
card validation stage. 
Total Tests 10 100 1000 10000 
Right Card, Right PIN, pass 3 35 450 4345 
Right Card, Right PIN, fail 2 18 97 1038 
Right Card, Wrong PIN, pass 0 0 7 100 
Right Card, Wrong PIN, fail 5 47 446 4517 
Table 21. Testing results for PIN validation (right card) 
Total Tests 10 100 1000 10000 
Wrong Card, Right PIN, pass 7 62 575 5624 
Wrong Card, Right PIN, fail 0 0 0 0 
Wrong Card, Wrong PIN, pass 0 0 0 0 
Wrong Card, Wrong PIN, fail 3 38 425 4376 
Table 22. Testing results for PIN validation (wrong card) 
The failure probabilities can be calculated from the test results: 
Conditional Probability Input Failure 
10 100 1000 10000 
Right Card, Right PIN Fails to go through 0.4 0.340 0.177 0.193 
Right Card, Wrong PIN Goes through 0 0 0.016 0.022 
Table 23. Failure probabilities for PIN validation (right card) 





10 100 1000 10000 
Wrong Card, Right PIN Goes through 1 1 1 1 
Wrong Card, Wrong PIN Goes through 0 0 0 0 
Table 24. Failure probabilities for PIN validation (wrong card) 
Step 4: Build a software model based on different levels of knowledge 
The software model can be constructed from the test results. There are two different 
strategies. The first is to inject only those detected failures.  The second, more 
conservative one, is to inject all possible failure modes using probability estimation.  
[Results of Strategy 1] 
A high-level software model is constructed using the test results in Table 16. The 
observed software failures are injected into SimPRA. (See Figure 47) 
 





The failure probabilities are stored in FIKB. The probability is obtained from 
different test results: 
• Case 1: 10 tests 
• Case 2: 100 tests 
• Case 3: 1000 tests 
• Case 4: 10000 tests 
The system is modeled at the highest level. The operational profile is based on the test 
results in Table 18. The following results are obtained after 500 runs: 
Test Case Escape Success LossOfOccupant Time 
Case 1 0.658 0.342 244.08 
Case 2 0.877 0.123 252.20 
Case 3 0.929 0.071 260.92 
Case 4 0.895 0.105 269.88 
Table 25. Simulation results for high-level PACS model 
A detailed-level software model is constructed using the test results in Table 19, 
Table 21, and Table 22. The observed software failures are injected into the Software 












Figure 49. Software model for PACS (PIN validation module) 
The failure probability is determined from the test results in Table 19, Table 21, and 
Table 22. The following is obtained after 500 runs: 
Test Case Escape Success LossOfOccupant Time 
Case 1 0.823 0.177 304.52 
Case 2 0.873 0.127 317.23 
Case 3 0.858 0.142 327.75 
Case 4 0.893 0.107 346.05 
Table 26. Simulation results for low-level PACS model 
[Results of Strategy 2] 
For the second strategy, all possible failure modes are injected into the software 
model, including failure modes not detected after several rounds of testing.  





amount, value, range, type, time, rate, duration, and load 
Rate is defined as the frequency at which the input is sent or the output is received. 
Duration is defined as the time period during which the input or the output lasts. Load 
is defined as the quantity that can be carried at one time by a specified input or output 
medium. These types of failure modes are typical in real time system with heavy 
loads, for instance, a server which processes requests from large amounts of clients 
simultaneously. PACS is a gate control system running on a single computer. The 
time interval between two human inputs is usually several seconds. The process time 
for every input is less than 0.001 second. Rate, duration, and load are not applicable 
for PACS.  
Amount, range, and type are the inputs from the human model. The human inputs are 
limited to a fixed amount of inputs in step 1. The testing is performed based on the 
input profile. There are no range, amount, or type failures existing in the profile. 
Assuming that the tester has a perfect knowledge about the inputs from the human, 
amount, range, and type failure modes are not considered in this experiment.  
The remaining failure modes value and time need to be explored. Three types of 
software failures are injected and detected in PACS. There are some other failures 
based on the logic of the software. 
1. A user with a correct card and a correct PIN cannot enter the gate (included) 
2. A user with an unauthorized card and a right PIN can enter the gate (included) 
3. A user with a correct card and a wrong PIN can enter the gate (included) 
4. A user with an unauthorized card and a wrong PIN can enter the gate 





informative priors is used to estimate the failure probability. One common used non-
informative priors is Beta(0.5, 0.5) [60]. The beta distribution is used to model the 
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=        (7.2) 
Since Beta distribution is conjugate with the Binomial distribution used as a 
likelihood function, the posterior function is a beta distribution Beta(0.5, 0.5+N). 
The mean value of the posterior distribution is used as the estimation of the 










α         (7.3) 
Based on that, the failure probabilities are recalculated for Table 17, Table 20, Table 
23 and Table 24.  
Conditional Probability Input Failure 
10 100 1000 10000 
Right Card, Right PIN Fails to go through 0.071 0.108 0.120 0.121 
Right Card, Wrong PIN Goes through 0.25 0.111 0.153 0.149 
Wrong Card, Right PIN Goes through 0.5 1 1 1 
Wrong Card, Wrong PIN Goes through 0.5 0.083 0.019 0.002 
Table 27.  Failure probabilities for high-level testing – strategy 2 (Bayesian approach) 
Conditional Probability Input Failure 
10 100 1000 10000 
Right Card Fails to go through 0.063 0.009 9.2e-4 9.1e-5 





Table 28. Failure probabilities for card validation – strategy 2 (Bayesian approach) 
Conditional Probability Input Failure 
10 100 1000 10000 
Right Card, Right PIN Fails to go through 0.4 0.340 0.177 0.193 
Right Card, Wrong PIN Goes through 0.083 0.010 0.016 0.022 
Table 29. Failure probabilities for PIN validation (right Card)  - strategy 2 (Bayesian approach) 
Conditional Probability Input Failure 
10 100 1000 10000 
Wrong Card, Right PIN Goes through 1 1 1 1 
Wrong Card, Wrong PIN Goes through 0.125 0.013 0.001 1.1e-4 
Table 30. Failure probabilities for PIN validation (wrong card)  - strategy 2 (Bayesian approach) 
Time-related failure mode is another type of failure mode to be considered. In the 
performance requirements section in PACS Software Requirements Specification 
(SRS), it states that the data validation should take less than 1 second. The testing 
time is collected for different rounds of testing.  
Total Number of Tests 10 100 1000 10000 
Total Time Used (second) NO9 NO 1 4 
Average Time for each validation NO NO 0.001 0.0004 
Table 31.  Testing time for PACS 
No time delay is observed in Table 31. The same equation is used to estimate the 
probability for time delay failures.  
Total Number of Tests 10 100 1000 10000 
Failure Probability 0.045 4.95e-3 4.995e-4 5e-5 
Table 32. Failure probabilities for time-delay failure (Bayesian approach) 
                                                 





The time delay failure is injected in the software model in addition to all other failure 
modes. Applying the results in Table 27, Table 28, Table 29, Table 30, and Table 32 
to the software model, the following results are obtained after 500 runs: 
Test Case Escape Success LossOfOccupant Time 
Case 1 0.755 0.245 234.094 
Case 2 0.881 0.119 232.844 
Case 3 0.894 0.106 242.172 
Case 4 0.907 0.093 262.703 
Table 33. Simulation results for high-level software model – strategy 2 (Bayesian approach) 
Test Case Escape Success LossOfOccupant Time 
Case 1 0.891 0.109 316.132 
Case 2 0.867 0.133 314.428 
Case 3 0.900 0.100 327.354 
Case 4 0.895 0.105 351.953 
Table 34. Simulation results for low-level software model – strategy 2 (Bayesian approach) 
[Further discussion] 
In the two strategies discussed before, the model is built based on the assumption that 
the tester has a perfect knowledge of the operational profile. In reality, this may not 
be true. If system analysts find out that some specific inputs are not tested, the failure 
probabilities need to be adjusted by either doing more testing or adjusting the 
probabilities based on conservative estimations for zero events.  
For instance, if the analyst finds out that there is an out-of-range failure in the user 
PIN input, the failure probability needs to be adjusted for this situation since there is 
no testing for out-of-range failure. Assuming that the probability for the user to input 
an out-of-range PIN is 1%, the software failure mode probabilities in Table 29 and 





recalculated using a conservative assumption. The extreme case is to assume the 
failure always happens once the user inputs an out-of-range value. In this case, if the 
failure mode is related with invalid PIN input, the probability can be adjusted using 
the following equation: 
01.099.0* += oldnew pp        (7.4) 
This is an extremely conservative assumption. But it is normally enough for low 
probability events at the beginning of the simulation. If the simulation results indicate 
that this part of the system is important, the model can be refined using more testing 
results if needed. 
Step 5: Inject the software code into the simulation environment and compare the 
results 
The real code is injected into the PACS model. The IO part is reconstructed to fit into 
the simulation environment. In that way, the input/output is processed in the 
simulation environment. The human model is modified to generate the real input from 
the input space (Table 14) for the software. The detailed card information and the PIN 
information are selected and sent to the software model. The card/PIN data are 
validated using the real code.  
The total number of lines of code (LOC) for PACS is 553, for the IO process part, 
185. So the code coverage for this analysis is 66.55%.  It can be increased when the 
human model is refined to incorporate the details of IO processes. 
A coverage related criterion is added to the simulation environment to ensure that all 





after 500 runs: 
Total Simulation Runs Escape Success LossOfOccupant Time 
500 0.883 0.117 414.91 
Table 35.  PACS simulation results (software code without coverage guidance) 
Step 6: Quantitative coverage results 
A post-simulation tool is designed to analyze the scenarios generated during 
simulation. The first guard action and the sequence of events prior to it are used to 
categorize the system level scenarios. See Figure 50 for the area studied inside the 
scenario. A quantitative coverage is assessed for the system level scenarios by 












Figure 50. Area studied for coverage analysis  
[Code simulation] 
The simulation results produce 74 different scenarios if one uses the real software 
code.  
 [Low-Level Simulation] 





simulation results for 500 runs: 
Test Case Valid Scenario Invalid Scenario Coverage 
Case 1 41 8 0.554 
Case 2 44 7 0.595 
Case 3 49 7 0.662 
Case 4 50 6 0.677 
Table 36. Coverage information for PACs low-level simulation 
As shown in Table 36, a reasonable number of scenarios are covered in the low-level 
simulation. The uncovered scenarios are not simulated after 500 runs because the 
probabilities for those scenarios are low and their impact on the final system end 
states is not high. Those scenarios can be covered eventually after enough rounds of 
simulation have been run. Meanwhile, because of the abstraction in the software 
modeling, some invalid scenarios appear in the simulation results; for instance, the 
scenarios previously mentioned: 
UserCard_f, UserCard_s, UserPIN_s, UserPIN_s, E-1,   
That is because the failures are dependent on a specific input. A conservative 
assumption is used when the model is constructed. Several inputs are grouped 
together in the model which introduces these invalid scenarios.  
For instance, in PACS, the first 5 users in Table 14 are treated as authorized users. 
Comparing the information in Table 14 and Table 15, one can find out that all 
authorized users are in the software database used, which means all authorized users 
could pass the card validation. Within the authorized users, Michael is the only 
person who can not pass PIN validation using his correct PIN. The conditional 





20% of the users with correct card can not pass through the PIN validation using the 
correct PIN.  That is the conditional failure probability used if all users with correct 
card are grouped as one input: correct card. Based on the probability, the following 
scenario becomes possible. 
UserCard_f, UserCard_s, UserPIN_s, UserPIN_s, E-1,   
But in reality, Michael is the only authorized user who can not pass PIN validation 
using his correct PIN. All other authorized users could pass the PIN validation using 
the correct PIN. Checking the scenario above, a user uses the correct card to pass card 
validation but fails to pass the PIN validation using his correct PIN at the first try. 
This indicates that the user could only be Michael. In the scenario, the user uses his 
correct PIN again and goes through the gate successfully. In reality, this is not the 
case since Michael will never be able to go through the gate using his correct PIN. 
This can be solved by either using the real code in the simulation or by building all 
detailed inputs into the software model.  
Checking the results in Table 26 and Table 36 reveals that even with the uncovered 
scenarios and invalid scenarios, the software model still captures the major scenarios 
during simulation and produces reasonably accurate results.  
[High-level Simulation] 
The scenarios generated for the high-level simulation contain basic events different 
from the low-level simulation and the code simulation. The card input event and the 
PIN input event are grouped as: 
• RCRP: Right Card, Right PIN 





• WCRP: Wrong Card, Right PIN 
• WCWP: Wrong Card, Wrong PIN 
• WCNP: Wrong Card, No PIN input anymore 
The detailed input events for low-level simulation are grouped together. For instance, 
the following combinations of basic events all belong to RCRP: 
• UserCard_s, UserPIN_s 
• UserCard_f, UserCard_s, UserPIN_f, UserPIN_s 
• UserCard_f, UserCard_f, UserCard_s, UserPIN_f, UserPIN_s 
The relationship between high-level scenarios and low-level scenarios is a one-to-
many relationship. There is a mapping among simulation results at different levels. 
Table 37 presents one example scenario from each level. Scenario 15 in the code 
simulation corresponds to Scenario 95 in level 1 simulation and Scenario 2 in level 0 
simulation. 
Level Example scenarios 
Code 15 : { FireProtection_Off@0 , 
UserCard_f(Christopher,1,5555)@7 , 
UserPIN_f(3333,5555)@17 , UserPIN_f(1111,5555)@30 , 
UserPIN_s(5555,5555)@44 , E-1@48 ,  } [ES-1 , 9.01E-1 , 
48.0] 
Level 1 95 : { FireProtection_Off@0 , UserCard_f@8 , 
CardValidation@9 , UserPIN_f@16 , UserPIN_f@28 , 
UserPIN_s@41 , E-1@47 ,  } [ES-1 , 3.63E-1 , 47.0] 
Level 0 2 : { FireProtection_Off@0 , WCRP@34 , swVal@35, E-
1@36 ,  } [ES-1 , 3.58E0 , 36.0] 
Table 37. Example scenarios for different levels 
7.6 Discussion 





figure is obtained.  
 
Figure 51. Simulation results from different strategies 
From Figure 51, the following phenomena are observed:  
1 The low level model simulation generates a better result compared with the high 
level model simulation as expected.  
2 When the number of tests is small, the conservative strategy increases the result 
performance dramatically for the high-level simulation. The reason for this is that 
most of the software failures are not detected after a small amount of tests. Using a 






3 When the number of tests is sufficient, the difference between the result from 
strategy 1 and conservative strategy 2 becomes small.  
4 Enough testing can ensure a good estimation of risk 
7.7 Summary 
This chapter introduces the gate-control system (PACS), and the whole modeling 
process is studied using our methodology.  The experimental-validation results show 
that: 
1. Using a software model in the simulation environment leads to a reasonably 
accurate estimate for the end-state probability.  
2. The software model can be refined after the analyst obtains more test results; 
the accuracy of end-state probabilities increases when the model improves. 
3. High-level simulation is less time-consuming, but this comes at the expense of 
lower scenario resolution.  
4. A smart adaptive simulation captures the benefits from both low-level 
simulation and high-level simulation; the simulation is less time consuming 





Chapter 8:  Procedure to Develop the Software Model in Case 
of Objective Data 
The integration approach is discussed in Chapter 5. This chapter provides further 
guidance on how to establish an accurate software representation when code is 
available and objective test data can be obtained. The procedure presented is based on 
lessons learnt from our experimental demonstration in Chapter 7. This approach can 
be used in addition to the integration approach discussed in Chapter 5. 
8.1 Approach 
Step 1: Build the executable low-level model for the software. 
In the first step, the analyst needs to decide how to abstract the real software. The 
lowest level abstraction for the software needs to be defined. The following 
constrains restrict the analyst’s modeling alternative to specific low-level models: 
• Inputs/outputs resolution from other models (human, hardware, software): the 
software model can not go beyond the level of resolution that other models 
can understand/produce. 
• Limits imposed by the code: the lowest level of abstraction can not go beyond 
the code resolution as expected. 
• Limits of the characteristic of the input/output variables: the software model 





• The lowest level software model should not break the dependences between 
input variables. 
An executable software model needs to be built using SFSM based on the abstraction. 
(Section 4.3) 
In the case of PACS, the input/output resolution of the human model stays at the level 
of correct card, wrong card, correct PIN and wrong PIN. This limits the lowest level 
of the PACS software model. The detailed card inputs and PIN inputs are grouped 
together as correct card and wrong card, correct PIN and wrong PIN. This is used as 
lowest input unit in the software model. 
Step 2: Define a multi-level structure for the software model. 
In this step, the analyst first needs to choose the functions to be abstracted, then 
define the abstraction methods and build the multi-level abstraction model for the 
software. The abstraction technique includes functional abstraction and continuous 
abstraction, which were introduced in section 4.2. 
Functional abstraction leads to the omission of details related to sub-functions. 
Continuous abstraction focuses on input-output transformations resulting from 
functional computations. Errors are introduced during the abstraction process. These 
errors fall into two groups, which are explained below. 
The scenarios generated in the DPRA environment contain a sequence of stochastic 
events resulting from model execution, and timing of occurrence. In between the 
points of occurrence of these random events, the behavior of the system is typically 





taking place in the system.  
The first group of errors modifies the deterministic behavior. Both abstraction 
techniques change the input/output relationship, i.e. if the expected behavior is )(if , 
the modified behavior is )()( iif ε+ . )(iε is the error introduced into the deterministic 
behavior. This group of errors can be quantified before the simulation. It is usually 
small at the component level. 
For instance, π≤≤= xxxf 0)sin()(  












Figure 52. Error introduced in the deterministic behavior 
The second group of errors modifies the stochastic events, such as software failures. 
There are three types of errors in this group: 
• Event error: the high-level events are usually a combination of low-level 
stochastic events. This thus introduces the event error. Normally the event 
error is acceptable if it does not influence the global behavior of the event. 
• Time error: the time of occurrence of the event is different since the details of 
the low-level events are not modeled in the high-level abstraction 
• Probability error: the probability of the event changes due to abstraction. The 
probability needs to be quantified using testing results. Probability error is 
introduced when the value of the probability used is not accurate. 
If the functional abstraction groups multiple stochastic events together, the event error 
will be introduced and the time error will be introduced also. The probability of the 
high-level event can be quantified using the high-level test result. The probability 
error is introduced if the test result is not accurate. 
Figure 53 a) presents a high-level event RCRP. The high-level event presents the 
combination of the low-level events in Figure 53 b). At the high level, based on the 
test results in Table 18 (10000 test cases), the characteristics of this event can be 
defined as: 
Probability p = 0.6126  






At the low level, based on the test results in Table 19, Table 21, and Table 22 (10000 
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5223.04777.01),_(1),_( =−=−= successvalidationPINpfailvalidationPINp  
The time needed for PIN validation is uniformly distributed between 6 seconds and 8 
seconds. 
Comparing the high-level event RCRP, the low-level events are card_validation and 
PIN_validation. The high-level event is a combination of the low-level events. The 
event is different thus event error exists in this situation. The time occurrence of the 
high-level event RCRP should map to the last event in the low-level sequence, time 
error is introduced if the occurrence of the event is not modeled correctly. Probability 




























a) High level Event - Right Card Right PIN




Figure 53. High-level event vs. low-level events 
The continuous abstraction does not deal with the combination of multiple stochastic 
events. But the accumulation of the errors, introduced in the deterministic behavior, 
over a chain of events may exceed a threshold which will lead to the occurrence of a 











For instance, considering the chain of events in Figure 54, errors are introduced in the 
abstraction of function f, g, and h. The propagation of the errors leads to an 
accumulated error є. If the error is large enough, it may influence the execution of the 
stochastic events following, such as the possible occurrence of a software failure. In 
this way, the event error and the probability error are introduced. If the continuous 
abstraction changes the software execution time, the time error is introduced also. 
The abstraction is recommended for the functions with the following characteristics: 
• The execution of the function is time-consuming. The abstraction can be a 
functional abstraction to reduce the complexity of the software function. It can 
also be a continuous abstraction to simplify the calculation process. 
• The function interacts with other models multiple times sequentially in one 
run. The functional abstraction should be used to group several interactions in 
one single time step if applicable. The sequential inputs from the interactions 
need to be combined together. 
Assuming the sequential inputs to the software function are f1 to fn, it needs to 
be combined as one single input: 
),,( 111 ni ffI L=   1)(},,{ 1 == ∑
m
mm IpIII L  (8.1) 
m represents the number of different combinations for sequential inputs f1 to 
fn. 
Other models need to be updated to be able to understand and produce this 
type of inputs. 










Figure 55. High-level function f vs. low-level function f 
Figure 55 presents a high-level abstraction model for function f and the low-level 
model for function f. Assume that the execution of each function block takes 1 time 
cycle. The execution of the high-level model only takes one time step. The low-level 
model contains two paths: Path1 (f1, f2, f3), Path2 (f1, f4, f5, f3). 
The average execution time is  
4*)2(3*)1( pathpPathptLL +=       (8.2) 
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Assume n different sequences of low-level stochastic events are grouped into 
1 event in the high-level model. The branches generated decrease by the factor 
of 1/n. 
In Figure 53, the high-level event includes six low-level stochastic events 
sequences. The branches generated will decrease by the factor of 1/6. 
The analyst needs to make a balance between the errors introduced during abstraction 
and the improvement brought to the computational complexity.  
Step 3: Obtain the operational profile for the software 
In this step, the analyst needs to obtain the operational profile [19] for the software 
from the software requirements and the system requirements. The test is conducted 
based on this profile. The profile is an external input profile from other models 
(hardware, software, human). 
If unexpected inputs to the software model are observed during the simulation, the 
profile needs to be updated. More testing needs to be conducted or the conservative 
estimation can be used to adjust the test results (See section 7.5 step 4). The 
conservative estimation can be obtained through the following equation: 
qqpp oldnew +−= )1(*        (8.4) 
Pnew is the new failure probability estimation 
Pold is the original failure probability obtained through testing.  
q represents the probability of the unexpected input detected 
In the case of PACS, for each user, the probability of inserting the right/wrong card is 





cards. Once the user inserts the card, the probability of inputting a right PIN is 0.55. 
Step 4: Define the possible software failure modes 
Based on the logic of the software, all possible software failure modes are defined in 
this step. There are eight types of failure modes defined for the software model. These 
are value, range, amount, type, time, rate, duration, and rate. The definition of the 
failure modes can be found in [2]. The analyst needs to study the applicability of each 
failure mode. 
In the case of PACS, amount, range, value, load, duration, and rate failure are not 
applicable. All possible value failures and time failures are defined and studied for 
PACS. 
Step 5: Test the software using the operational profile 
In this step, the software is tested using the operational profile defined in step 3. The 
test is performed at different levels. 
Assume that the external profile defined in step 3 is represented as: 
ii niipII ,,1)}(,{ L==      (8.5) 
The profile for the software function to be tested is presented as:  
fif niipII ,,1)}(,{ L==      (8.6) 
The output is represented as  
oif niipOO ,,1)}(,{ L==      (8.7) 
If II f ⊆ , which means that the software function to be tested is only related with the 
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which means the inputs of the software to be tested are not only from the external 
profile, but also dependent on the outputs of the other software to be tested (software 
component 1) (case b in Figure 56), the software profile needs to be updated in the 
following condition. 
If unexpected software failures are observed in the test result for software component 
1, and the software failures detected introduce some unexpected outputs, the profile 
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Figure 56. Different conditions for software testing 
The probability of the software failure is calculated using the following equation: 
casestesttotalofnumber
failureswithcasestestofnumberp =      (8.10)  
In the case of PACS, the test is performed at the high level and the low level. The 
input profile of the high level test is only influenced by the human model. Thus it can 
be tested directly using the operation profile. The low-level test includes the tests for 





human model. It can be tested directly using the profile obtained from the human 
model. Based on the design document, the perfect card validation should have the 
following results: 
• A user with a right card can pass the card validation 
• A user with a wrong card can not pass the card validation 
The following software failures are detected during testing of card validation: 
• A user with a right card can not pass the card validation 
• A user with a wrong card can pass the card validation 
Since the input profile of PIN validation is dependent on the human input and the 
results from card validation, it needs to be updated based on the software failure 
detected. The initial input profile for PIN validation only includes: 
• PIN profile for the user with a correct card 
Based on software failures observed in the implementation of the function card 
validation, the following profile should be added to the original profile: 
• PIN profile for the user with a wrong card that passes the card validation 
The PIN validation function needs to be tested for both conditions.  
Step 6: Analyze the test results 
The test results are analyzed in this step. The software failure modes need to be 
quantified using the test results. The test results are first categorized based on the type 
of inputs and outputs. The conditional probability for each failure mode is calculated 
if the failure mode is observed.  





to next sequential component, it may introduce a new combination of sequential 
inputs. If the high-level abstraction model combines the sequential inputs during 
abstraction, and the newly discovered sequence does not belong to the original 
combination set, the new sequence combination needs to be added as a new input to 
the high level model. 
IIffI mnm ∉= ++ 1
''
1 )},,{( 1 L    1+= mIII U   (8.11) 
Also the probability profile for each input to the high-level model needs to be 
replaced based on the profile observed in the test results. 
For instance, in the case of PACS, Table 16 lists the high-level test results for PACS. 
The results are categorized based on the inputs (right card, wrong card, right PIN, 
wrong PIN) and output (success, fail). The probability for each failure mode is 
calculated and presented in Table 17. In this case, the high-level operation profile is 
influenced by software errors. Thus the profile is updated as in Table 18. 
Step 7: Estimate the probability for undetected software failures 
If some software failures defined in step 5 are not discovered in the simulation results, 
the conservative estimation should be used to estimate the failure probability. The 
estimation can be done using the Bayesian Approach defined in Chapter 6. The 
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In the case of PACS, some failure modes are not detected after a small amount of 





conservative estimation. The simulation results indicate that the undetected software 
failures are effectively represented using the conservative estimation. 
Step 8: Inject the software failures in the executable software model 
The software failures are injected in the multi-level software model defined in step 2. 
AKB and FIKB needs to be constructed based on the testing results 
8.2 Discussion 
The approach defined in this chapter is applicable to the case when the real software 
is available. If the real software is not available, the software failures need to be 
quantified using expert judgment or statistical data from similar projects. The basic 
steps for this case are: 
Step 1: Build the executable low-level model for the software. 
Step 2: Define multi-level structure for the software model. 
Step 3: Define the possible software failure modes. 
Step 4: Quantify the probabilities of software failure modes using expert judgment or 
statistical data.  





Chapter 9:  Conclusion and Future Work 
9.1 Conclusion 
DPRA is a methodology to assess the probability of failure or success of a mission. 
The current DPRA environments do not allow modeling of software risk contribution. 
This dissertation describes a framework and a set of techniques to extend the DPRA 
approach to allow consideration of the software contributions on system risk. The 
framework includes a software representation, an approach to incorporate the 
software representation into the DPRA environment SimPRA, and an experimental 
demonstration of the methodology. 
Here are the major contributions: 
• Systematically identify the software modeling requirements for simulation-
based DPRA environments  
• Assess the existing software representations with respect to the DPRA 
modeling requirements 
• Extend the concept of FSM to SFSM and apply it to the area of software 
modeling DPRA environments 
• Establish a software representation framework including a software behavior 
model and a software guidance model 
• Build a multi-level software representation using functional abstraction and 





• Integrate the failure mode taxonomy developed by Li [2] in the software 
representation 
• Develop the mechanism to separate the software-related knowledge with the 
system-related knowledge 
• Define the structure for AKB, FIKB, SKB 
• Propose a framework to simulate the multi-level objects in the simulation-
based DPRA environment 
• Enhance the current single-level SimPRA to support multi-level objects in the 
modeling framework 
• Apply the concept of entropy to dynamically control the simulation level of 
detail for the multi-level objects 
• Implement the entire methodology in the SimPRA software 
• Develop an easy to use tool to help the analyst develop the software model 
• Conduct an experimental demonstration to study the quantification aspects of 
the software model when objective test data is available 
o Develop a consistently quantified software representation 
o Embed software profile information in the software model 
o Cover the  failure mode taxonomy developed by Li 
o Obtain data from testing 
o Account for the dependencies between model components 
o Compare the software model simulation results with the simulation 





• Formalize a procedure to establish a consistently quantified software model 
when code is available and objective test data can be obtained 
9.2 Future Work 
This dissertation describes a framework for integrating software into Dynamic PRA. 
It is the first study of its kind.  More research is needed. Below are some possible 
avenues for future research: 
9.2.1 Large scale validation 
Although a case study has been provided, which demonstrates the applicability of this 
framework and of the set of techniques developed, the methodology should be 
applied to a large system. Problems that arise in that process need to be identified, 
and their solutions should be provided.  
9.2.2 Software-related knowledge 
Different types of prior software-related knowledge may exist. In this dissertation, the 
time-factor information was added to SKB and supported by the multi-level scheduler 
and planner. In future research, different types of software-related information could 
be defined and added to SKB. For instance, different software-abstraction levels 
could be associated with different levels of accuracy in the results.  The accuracy-
related factor could then be added to SKB.. The current multi-level simulation 
environment provides an open interface which easily allows the introduction of new 





9.2.3 Software-testing knowledge 
SimPRA uses two types of information to guide the simulation: prior knowledge and 
knowledge obtained during the simulation. 
In this dissertation, the knowledge obtained during simulation is mainly entropy-
based information. Knowledge about the relationship between branch selection and 
end-state probabilities is summarized after simulation. The information gain is 
dynamically updated to adjust the simulated branch selection process. 
Other types of information can also be used to adaptively adjust the simulation, for 
instance, the software test coverage information. Various software coverage indices 
(i.e. statement coverage, branch coverage, etc) can be calculated after simulation. In 
subsequent simulations an uncovered statement, branch could receive additional 
weighting compared with statement, branches already covered.  
In the current SimPRA environment, when the system simulator proposes transitions 
to the scheduler, the scheduler retrieves the information for the proposed transitions 
and decides which branch to explore, based on the previous simulation results. The 
new framework can be upgraded to include the instruction from sub-component 

























Figure 57. New framework for branch exploration 
The coverage information is a different type of information for branch decisions. The 
system scheduler needs to combine its current entropy-based decision and the 
decision generated by the software-guidance model and based on the software 
coverage results. Different strategies can be defined to combine the two decisions. 
Strategy 1: 
Different weights can be assigned to the entropy-based information on the one hand 
and software coverage on the other, depending on the simulation goal. The analyst 
decides the weights, based on the simulation requirements. If a complete software 
branch exploration is expected as a result of the simulation, the software-coverage 
weight should be assigned a higher value. If the simulation focuses on final system 






An adaptive-selection strategy can be defined, based on the simulation process. If the 
entropy-based information is insufficient initially because of a lack of simulation 
results, the system scheduler may base its decision on the coverage information 
received from the software-guidance model. If entropy-based uncertainty is low after 
many rounds of simulation, the system scheduler can select branches based mainly on 
entropy-based information.  
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